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Abstract
This quasi-experimental before-and-after study examined the impacts of using
IPv6 extension headers to carry cryptographic Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) route
attestation information. Literature was assessed surrounding: the design of BGP,
vulnerabilities in BGP, a survey of proposed route attestation solutions, IPv6 extension
header design, overhead in cryptography, and factors influencing the adoption of
proposed solutions. The literature surveyed showed a need to evaluate IPv6 and its role
in helping secure the Internet’s routing protocol, BGP. The study resulted in statically
significant figures representing the cost associated in an instantiation of using IPv6
extension headers to carry BGP route attestation information. Furthermore, future
opportunities for research to improve upon overall BGP security and the inclusion of
IPv6 in such models were discussed. The research performed revealed potential
pathways for enhancing Internet routing as a whole.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
The matter of this quasi-experimental before-and-after study was the impact of
using IPv6 to perform Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) routing update attestation and
measuring the resulting impacts. The study was designed to measure a method of
protecting BGP, which all Internet traffic is dependent on, thus affecting all users.
According to Cardona, Vissicchio, Lucente, and Francois (2016) BGP is the standard
routing protocol used across the Internet. Despite the critical role BGP plays in directing
Internet traffic, the standardized version of the protocol lacks the ability to validate and
authorize other BGP speakers to take ownership of a network. The result is a system
based solely on trust, leaving systems vulnerable to malicious actors stealing or
modifying network traffic. Stolen or modified network traffic may result in denial of
service (DoS) or the loss of sensitive information. The transition to a secure
implementation of the routing protocol has been hindered by adoptability and limitations
in proposed solutions (P. Gill, Schapira, & Goldberg, 2011). Many of the proposed
solutions address Internet Protocol version 4 (IPv4), but not IP version 6 (IPv6) which the
Internet is moving towards since the available pool of IPv4 addresses is exhausted. As a
result, the Internet is forced to adopt IPv6, therefore demonstrating a need to assess
security of BGP in the context of IPv6.
The focus of this study was to create and evaluate a model of performing
validation and authorization of routing updates in an IPv6 space while quantitatively
measuring the performance impact of the solution. As the Internet has adopted BGP-4 as
the standard inter-domain routing protocol after its release in 1995 (Traina, 1995), it is
important to secure it in an efficient, scalable, and highly-adoptable way. Many existing
solutions have suffered poor adoption due to a high cost or poor effectiveness in a
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partially deployed environment (Lychev, Goldberg, & Schapira, 2013). P. Gill et al.
(2011) indicated the importance of finding such a solution to the existing issues within
BGP, citing economic and security implications entering the spotlight of major entities on
the Internet.
A common result of increasing the security of a system or process is a negative
impact on performance. Chapter 1 details the proposed study of how a model leveraging
the efficiencies of IPv6 can provide an adoptable security model for enhancing BGP
while minding the performance implications of doing such. The chapter will introduce
the background of the study, significance of the study, design of the study, as well as the
potential outcomes and resulting impact. Additional dialogue will ascertain key issues
that are suggested for research alongside of important questions pertaining to said
research. The purpose of this study was to determine whether the efficiencies introduced
in the IPv6 protocol may aid a BGP security model in circumventing routing attacks and
to measure the performance penalty of participating routers.
Background of the Study
The Internet is composed of countless entities that own networks or IP addresses,
and those entities are interconnected through different topologies and configurations. For
example, some of these entities may have direct connections between each other, while
others may connect through one or more Internet service providers. The methods of
establishing an online presence and connecting with other organizations is innumerable.
This flexibility of topology design is made possible by interdomain routing protocols.
Interdomain routing is a fundamental component of how the Internet works. As
new networks are created and others taken offline, the Internet is in a constantly changing
state (Gao, 2001). To cope with the volatile nature of the Internet, interdomain routing
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protocols are leveraged by entities participating in Internet communication. These
protocols are designed to not only inform other parties of the networks that exist, but
offer a roadmap of how to reach those networks (Kuhn, Liu, & Rossman, 2009). The
underlying goal of an interdomain routing protocol is to provide an accurate and up-todate picture of reachable networks alongside of a reliable path by which to reach them (P.
Gill, Schapira, & Goldberg, 2013).
The previously described interconnected entities, or autonomous systems, exist
within the Internet and interdomain routing ecosystem. Although the definition of an
autonomous system (AS) is somewhat ambiguous (Hawkinson & Bates, 1996), Gao
(2001) describes an autonomous system as portion of a network operated by an
administrative domain. Furthermore, autonomous systems are referred to by a globally
unique number assigned by a governing body like the Internet Assigned Numbers
Authority (Vohra & Chen, 2012). An autonomous system number may look like
AS23122. Examples of these types of administrative domains that own autonomous
systems may be Internet service providers (ISPs), universities, and companies. In
addition, one administrative domain may operate numerous autonomous systems as a
smaller portion of their expanse. Interdomain routing facilitates the communication
between these autonomous systems.
Prior to the widespread adoption of BGP, several other external routing protocols
were used on the public Internet. Many of those also existed inside of private networks
such as the Exterior Gateway Protocol (EGP), Routing Information Protocol (RIP), and
Open Shortest Path First (OSPF). Due to the nature of how the Internet has grown and
the complex interconnections between networks, significant topological issues arose with
the protocols preceding BGP (Traina, 1995). The limitations with protocols such as EGP
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became impractical from both technical and operational standpoints. According to Traina
(1995), BGP addressed these limitations and matched the IP hop-by-hop archetype
necessitated by the Internet’s design.
The first version of the BGP came from Lougheed and Rekhter (1989) as a new
protocol to enable the exchange of information and routes between autonomous systems.
It was deemed as an “inter-autonomous system” routing protocol. Alongside the
evolution of the Internet, the BGP protocol developed as well, resulting in several
versions that addressed shortcomings in protocols such as EGP. Yakov Rekhter and Li
(1995) introduced BGP version four (BGP-4), the currently used standard, in a request
for comment (RFC). This version reflected changes and the need for efficiency in
performance of such routing protocols.
Since the introduction of BGP-4 in 1995, BGP has become the most widely used
inter domain routing protocol. In fact, Jakub et al. (2014) assert that BGP is the only
deployed interdomain routing protocol in use on the Internet. BGP is responsible for
directing traffic between various autonomous systems across the Internet and on a large
scale, serves as the backbone of the Internet (Medhi & Ramasamy, 2007). Since its
introduction, BGP is still being used as the de-facto standard for inter domain routing
after a decade of use and progression. Effectively, any traffic leaving an autonomous
system such as an Internet service provider (ISP) to a second autonomous system will be
routed by BGP at some point. The scale of Internet traffic relying on this protocol is
colossal.
During BGPs introduction, it was built upon an inherent model of trust. When a
BGP speaker announces a new route stemming from a number of events such as a
network being added, networks being segmented or deleted, a new shorter path between
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endpoints, etc., each neighboring BGP peer does not validate or attest the route
information. Rather, the neighbors propagate the route update to their peers (Qi et al.,
2012). The result of this model is a lightweight approach to passing information vital to
the flow of Internet traffic. BGP does not introduce a significant amount of overhead on
the routers participating compared to trust models such as public key infrastructure (PKI)
(Peyravian, Roginsky, & Zunic, 2004). Despite the advantages of an inherent trust
model, there are significant risks and outcomes if a malicious entity enters the ecosystem.
If the routers responsible for directing traffic between autonomous systems cannot
attest the routes that they are receiving due to a lack of support in the BGP-4 protocol
specification, a variation of negative impacts may occur to Internet users on a large scale.
There have been multiple notable instances of undesirable affects from BGP
misconfiguration and possible route hijacking attacks. Regardless of the intent or
motivation behind the route redirection via BGP, the impacts are clearly visible and
problematic.
One of the most notable BGP hijacking instances is the YouTube hijacking by
Pakistani ISP, AS17557 (Bornhauser & Martini, 2011). The YouTube hijacking was the
direct result of a sub-prefix hijack attack as according to Bornhauser and Martini (2011)
AS17557 advertised a network prefix of 208.65.153.0/24 which belongs to the larger
subnet 208.64.152.0/22. Since a larger prefix was advertised to the Internet, BGP peers
of AS17557 trusted the route update by the nature of how BGP designed, the larger the
prefix, the more trusted. This property aligns with the largest-prefix match rule of BGP.
The hijacking by the Pakistani ISP clearly demonstrated a politically motivated denial of
service that had greater reach than originally intended by those who introduced it.
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A second example of BGP redirection and prefix hijacking occurred in 2013. An
ISP in Belarus, GlobalOneBel, intercepted traffic from several countries beginning on
July 31, 2013 and continuing through August 19, 2013 (Yun & Song, 2015). As noted by
Yun, traffic from various countries’ financial institutions, governments, and network
service providers were affected including those residing in the United States. In this
particular scenario, traffic was intercepted and forwarded on as seen in common Man-InThe-Middle (MITM) attacks rather than creating denial of service (DoS) conditions.
A third, more recent example of BGP route hijacking began on February 2014 via
a Canadian ISP. Over the course of this hijacking that lasted nearly four months,
attackers compromised 51 networks and 19 different ISPs (Sun et al., 2015). The
motivation of this type of attack appeared to be financially driven. Attackers were able to
steal approximately $83,000 in Bitcoins, a cryptocurrency according to Sun et al. (2015).
It is quite evident from this publicly disclosed incident that BGP route hijacking attacks
can affect a relatively significant number of entities while evading detection. Parceling
away such a sum of money over the course of several months is no small feat, but the
attackers were greatly assisted by the inherent flaws in the protocol.
In light of the outlined incidents in addition to others not documented above, the
FCC has identified IP route hijacking as one of the top three areas of concern of cyber
security in 2012 (FCC, 2012). Furthermore, the Department of Homeland security
included route hijacking via BGP as a primary vulnerability within their Internet routing,
access, and connection services function in version 1.0 of the Information Technology
Sector Baseline Risk Assessment (Bullock, Haddow, & Coppola, 2015). Similarly
Karlin, Forrest, and Rexford (2009) show through their study how nation-sates have been
able to impact the flow of Internet traffic through BGP resulting in enforced censorship
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and wiretapping. The lack of route attestation is one of the contributing factors to the
threats outlined by these agencies and people, which demonstrates a clear need to
improve the security of BGP and the devices participating in the protocol.
Statement of the Problem
A critical problem arose from the fact that BGP is the most widely used routing
protocol on the publicly facing Internet, yet it lacks fundamental security mechanisms.
For example, when following its longest prefix matching property, BGP has no security
mechanisms that protect the validity and integrity of routing updates by performing route
attestation (Qiu, Gao, Ranjan, & Nucci, 2007). Research clearly showed that due to the
lack of security mechanisms built into BGP and the inherent trust model that the protocol
is built upon, BGP is susceptible to cyber-attacks including prefix hijacking, IP spoofing,
session stealing and others (Murphy, 2006). Misconfigurations in BGP or malicious
actors may lead to undesired outcomes (Mahajan, Wetherall, & Anderson, 2002) that can
negatively impact network communication on a large scale through denial-of-service,
traffic redirection, increase in spam, and information disclosure via stolen traffic
(Mcarthur & Guirguis, 2009). The Department of Homeland Security (Bullock et al.,
2015) and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC, 2012) have both clearly
defined this issue to be of great importance .
There have been several proposed solutions to protecting the authenticity and
validity of BGP routing updates (Bruhadeshwar, Kulkarni, & Liu, 2011; Hu, Perrig, &
Sirbu, 2004; J. Israr, Guennoun, Mouftah, & Rahman, 2010; Kent, Lynn, & Seo, 2000;
Malhotra & Goldberg, 2014; White, 2003; Ying, Zheng, Mao, & Hu, 2009). However,
these proposed solutions introduced significant system overhead or had poor adoption
rates (Butler, Farley, McDaniel, & Rexford, 2010). Furthermore, according to Butler
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(2010), little has been done to assess the security implications of routing BGP over IPv6
and using IPv6 extensions to mitigate risks associated with the trust model of BGP.
Therefore, the specific problem is that the interdomain routing protocol used in the
Internet lacks a method for performing route attestation without introducing unacceptable
amounts of overhead, nor do proposed solutions address IPv6’s impact in terms of added
efficiencies and built-in security solutions such as IPSec.
The study focused on observing an ecosystem of virtualized routers in an
environment that was controlled by the researcher and measured to study performance
impacts of participating routers. Virtual routers followed the same rule-sets and purpose
of a traditional physical router, but existed entirely in software. This allowed the study to
be expanded without requiring additional equipment and the costs associated with it. The
process of routing via BGP is not dependent on physical equipment; rather the process
and instructions are defined in software. Routers were be measured in normal or typical
operation to gain a baseline of performance impacts in an uninfluenced environment.
The researcher then introduced the prosed model to mitigate sub-prefix hijacking attacks
using IPv6 and evaluated the resulting impact and effectiveness.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this quasi-experimental before-and-after study was to measure the
feasibility of using IPv6 extension headers in an effort to validate the authenticity of a
BGP routing update and describe the performance implications or overhead of doing so.
In order to accomplish this goal, a security model was built to leverage IPv6 extension
headers in a controlled environment to first determine the feasibility of detecting specific
BGP sub-prefix hijacking attacks and secondly mark the appropriate route updates as
invalid. Selecting only BGP sub-prefix hijacking attacks significantly narrowed down
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the scope of the research while also providing a framework by which BGP events were
selected or created for observation. The study was also by nature iterative as it may be
repeated with other types of attacks against the BGP protocol.
Significance of the Study
BGP is the de-facto-standard Internet routing protocol and impacts nearly all
traffic flowing across the Internet (Hawkinson & Bates, 1996). As Phillipa, Michael, and
Sharon (2013) indicate, BGP is the Internet’s routing protocol, it is absolutely critical to
the operation of the Internet (Mahajan et al., 2002). This includes impacts to users,
businesses, governments, and others. Considering the role BGP plays as the Internet’s
routing protocol, the nature of interdomain routing, and multudinous vulnerabilities, Ola
and Constantinos (2004), suggested that successful attacks on BGP can affect signficant
numbers of people on a global scale.
IPv6 is replacing IPv4 infrastructure as address space has become quite scarce
with many exhaustion milestones being already reached (Jakub et al., 2014). Jakub et al.
(2014) noted that nearly every measure of IPv6 adoption has increased by an order of
magnitude. With IPv4 address acquisition costs rising and the total available IPv4
addresses shrinking to below 4% remaining, researchers predict that a continued growh
of IPv6 and an exhaustion of IPv4 addresses by 2018 (Sebastian, Lachlan, & Grenville,
2014). As a result of the forthcoming exhaustion of IPv4, Internet users and providers
alike will have no choice but to begin adoping and actively implementing IPv6 support
across their infrastructure.
As sub-prefix hijacking is a significant threat to BGP infrastructure, numerous
solutions have been proposed (Bruhadeshwar et al., 2011; Hu et al., 2004; J. Israr et al.,
2010; Kent et al., 2000; Malhotra & Goldberg, 2014; White, 2003; Ying et al., 2009).
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This study expanded upon the existing research that has been done to improve the
security posture of autonomous systems participating in BGP against sub-prefix hijacking
attacks. As suggested by Ballani et. al. (2007), there are significant issues associated
with solutions to sub-prefix hijacking that need to be rethought and solved.
Due to the already widespread usage of BGP, rising adoptation rates of IPv6, and
clear need to revise existing sub-prefix hijacking mitigation methods, this research
resides in a highly desirable area. The maturity of IPv6 is developing, as IPv4 address
space is limited, and with that protocol stability and efficiences are rising as well (Jakub
et al., 2015). Standardization by organizations comprised of network designers,
operators, vendors, and researchers on an international scale such as the Internet
Engineering Task Force (IETF) shape the way Internet protocols work (Alvestrand,
2004). Proposals to replace the BGP protocol, such as the Inter Domain Routing Protocol
(IDRP), have gained little traction and have never been standardized by the IETF making
them obsolete (Savola, 2005). From these assertations, the state of inter-domain routing
showed a clear need for further research in mitigating specific threats to BGP routing
such as sub-prefix hijacking over maturing IP standards as the potential for detrimental
impacts is grand.
Nature of the Study
Guided by the proposed research question, the data to be gathered in this study
was numerical and analyzed from a pre and post application assessment. According to
Creswell (2009) research surrounding experimental design resulting in numeric data to
study are best suited under quantitative research. Creswell developed this appropriation
of quantitative research methods to the study by specifically outlining their quality of use
in performance analysis of systems. This was appropriate as it directly matches the
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desired outcomes of the study: to measure the resulting performance impact of using IPv6
extension headers in a model that performs BGP route attestation.
For this study, a quantitative experimental approach was used over other designs
such as non-experimental studies or semi-experimental studies. While there are
numerous ways to analyze this issue and measure the results of the proposed model
numerically, the experimental approach to the study met the needs in accordance with the
nature of the study. According to Creswell (2009), the research design is a platform to
shape the plans and procedures for a researcher to follow. Therefore, these plans and
procedures served as the guiding direction for the data collection of the study along with
the analysis of that information. In this study, the models common to other research in
the field was adapted to meet the specific requirements outlined in this proposal.
Furthermore, an experimental study will provide a framework for obtaining the
desired measurements when evaluating the problem statement of this research. As
Keppel and Wickens (2004) describe, an experimental research design encompasses two
treatment conditions. The subjects in each condition are treated the same except for one
single change is introduced, and the effects are measured after the researcher’s
intervention. By the nature of what an experiment is, if there was only one change
introduced while everything else was kept identical, the measurable observation must
have been caused the single introduced change.
In choosing the design of the experimental study, Kumar (2005) suggested
analyzing the problem from three different perspectives. These perspectives prompted
the researcher to evaluate how many contacts he or she was to have with the subjects, the
reference period of the study, and lastly the nature of the study. The result being a deeper
review of methodologies as the focus is narrowed. As this study was highly technical in
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nature and the analysis was performed in pre-measurement, application of research
model, and post measurement, the design of the study was reviewed from the perspective
of the nature of the investigation.
Within the categorization of the nature of the investigation, there are three relating
study designs: experimental, non-experimental, and semi-experimental (Kumar, 2005).
Experimental studies are those where a researcher introduces an intervention in a
controlled environment expecting to observe a change, and measuring the change when it
happens. Non-experimental studies a researcher attempts to retroactively determine the
cause for already observed changes. This study was proactive in the sense that the
perceived outcomes had not already been observed, but were to be induced by the
researcher’s influence; therefore, non-experimental design was not appropriate in this
case. Lastly, semi-experimental designs contain properties of both experimental and nonexperimental studies. Again, as this study was not focused on the retroactive causation of
an observable event, a semi-experimental design was not the best suited.
When further defining the experimental strategy to be used in this study, it was
important to consider the desired data to be collected and analyzed. The study was
largely focused on measuring the performance impact in a scalable security solution to
defending BGP against sub-prefix hijack attacks. As discussed, performance metrics in
this type of environment can be easily measured qualitatively. Experimental research
that is qualitative can be further separated out into true experiments where subjects are
randomly chosen and quasi-experimental where subjects are nonrandomized (Creswell,
2009). As the experimental study was performed in a controlled environment and
variables were measured before and after the administration of a researcher-imposed

13
technical change, the randomization of subjects was not necessary. As a result, the quasiexperimental classification was used.
With respect to the quasi-experimental research design of this study, it was
important to define a design that will guide the collection of data and analysis to
determine the resulting outcome. While many quasi-experimental research designs exist,
a before-and-after design was used. This design dictated that a state of the variables were
to be measured before the intervention and then again after the intervention (Kumar,
2005). These measurements formed the ground for analysis of the data. The data
represented the quantitative change in performance of a router participating in the BGP
sub-prefix hijacking mitigation model using IPv6 headers for transport of route
attestation information. A before-and-after design does have certain limitations that are
discussed in a future section.
Research Questions
This study focused on one primary research question. The primary research
objective was to determine if IPv6 extension headers are used in a model to validate BGP
route updates received from a peer router, what the resulting impact in terms of overhead
on the participating router were. Therefore, the use of this research is to determine if
IPv6 extension headers are a viable tool to mitigate BGP sub-prefix hijacking attacks by
performing route attestation, while introducing minimal overhead.
The purpose statement of this study was specified that the research conducted will
measure the effectiveness of a proposed model using IPv6 extension headers to mitigate
BGP sub-prefix hijacking attacks. To effectively measure this and focus the research, the
following question focused the research:
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In a model where IPv6 extension headers are used to successfully perform
route attestation of BGP updates, what is the resulting degree of difference
exists in terms of router CPU utilization percentage, RAM utilization
percentage, route convergence time, and BGP update packet size in
comparison to a router not participating in the model?
The above question was used to derive results indicating whether IPv6 extension
headers are capable of carrying the necessary information to perform basic BGP route
attestation. With a limited amount of space in each IPv6 datagram header, the necessary
information to perform route attestation such as authorization of origin had a restricted
data size. The model proposed was designed to perform lightweight route validation.
The consequential hypothesis of this question was that given a model designed to
perform lightweight route attestation, necessary information to perform the task may be
carried inside of IPv6 extension headers within constraints defined by the protocol
specification without imparting performance overhead.
Furthermore, the research question guided the measurement of the performance
impact on the routers participating in the model. Performance impact was measured in
terms of CPU usage, RAM consumption, route convergence time, and route update
packet size.
Guided by the above question, quantitative measurements were gathered on the
model’s impact in performance overhead of participating routers. These results, when
compared to results gathered of a non-participating router clearly identified the impact of
the proposed model. This methodology followed the literature covering experimental
design and the measurement of researcher introduced changes in such models (Keppel &
Wickens, 2004; Kumar, 2005). The follow-on hypothesis derived from this research
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question stated that route attestation will result in performance overhead, but be
minimized by the use of IPv6 extension headers due to the protocol improvements
compared to IPv4 implementations and eliminating the need to carry attestation
information in separate packets.
A hypothesis is defined by Salkind (2010) as a tentative statement describing the
relationship between variables in a study. The uncertainty or tentativeness of such
statement leads into the purpose of research, to empirically analyze and observe such
relationship and report on those findings. Given such definition of hypothesis, one can
infer that it is not the duty of the researcher to prove the hypothesis true. Rather, it is the
researcher’s onus to evaluate the hypothesis given the constraints and paradigms that it
defines.
Theoretical Framework
Theoretical frameworks as defined by Kumar (2005) are a place of grounding or
basis upon which research is conducted. These frameworks and ideas come from a
paradoxical explanation that surveying the literature related to a topic will reveal general
theories, which can be intertwined into a theoretical framework; yet choosing the right
literature to survey is dictated by the chosen theoretical basis. The basis of the theoretical
framework that the research will follow stems from a loosely defined framework
compiled from ideas presented in relevant literature. As Bryant (2004) noted, the
framework will further develop from loose theories into a better-defined guide. From this
guide or theoretical framework, the research here was better scoped and more likely to
contribute to the intended areas.
The goal of this study was to determine if IPv6 extension headers could be used in
a model to perform BGP route attestation while introducing minimal overhead due to
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efficiencies in IPv6. According to Lammle (2013) IPv6 brings many enhancements to
the IPv4 protocol suite in terms of header structure, address space, field alignment, and
includes by default many of the features of IPv4 that were amendments during its
lifespan. These enhancements in IPv6, in general, state that packets traversing a pure
IPv6 network are more likely to be processed and transmitted in a shorter amount of time
when compared to their IPv4 counter parts.
IPv6 extension headers may be able to carry BGP route attestation information
sufficiently. In contrast to IPv4 headers where static fields were required and length
limitations were imposed, IPv6 allows for optional headers of variable length (Lammle,
2013). The format and design of IPv6 extension headers allows for a faster processing
time and more dynamic control of information assigned in each header. In addition, only
the destination routers or devices need to process the IPv6 headers, intermediary devices
do not (Carpenter & Jiang, 2013).
One way of measuring IPv6 packet efficiency and comparing it to IPv4 in
addition to router CPU and memory consumption is measuring the round-trip time
(RTT). In studies, IPv6 packets have a smaller round-trip time than IPv4 packets (Yi,
Shaozhi, & Xing, 2005) indicating a performance increase than when compared to IPv4.
The study performed by Yi et al. demonstrated that in implemented testing scenarios of
real unicast data used to mimic web browsing that IPv6 showed a consistently lower RTT
compared to IPv4. Unicast packets are the same type of packets that BGP utilizes to
exchange route updates, so it was reasonable to suggest the same performance
generalization would be seen in BGP route updates while using IPv6.
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Definitions
Autonomous System: “An AS is a connected group of one or more IP prefixes run
by one or more network operators which has a SINGLE and CLEARLY DEFINED
routing policy.” (Hawkinson & Bates, 1996)
Control Plane: Path determination part of the routing process where a route from
a source is determined to a given destination. (Schuchard et al., 2010)
Data Plane: The part of the routing process where packets are actually forwarded
to their destination.(Schuchard et al., 2010)
Interdomain Routing: Moving packets from a device in one autonomous system
to a device in another autonomous system.
Overhead: The measurement of additional CPU consumption, memory
consumption, route convergence time.
Prefix: “The term "prefix" as it is used here is equivalent to "CIDR block", and in
simple terms may be thought of as a group of one or more networks. We use the term
"network" to mean classful network, or "A, B, C network".” (Hawkinson & Bates, 1996)
Round-trip Time: The time it takes a packet to be sent to a destination combined
with time it takes for the destination to acknowledge the receipt of the packet. (Grigorik,
2013)
Routing: Moving a packet from one device on a network and moving it to a
device on a different network (Lammle, 2013)
Route Attestation: A system or process used to guarantee the authenticity and
correctness of a routing update. (Qi et al., 2012)
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Assumptions
There is no research study that is completely perfect in its design, approach, or
certainty; for that reason, a researcher must make assumptions about the study (Bryant,
2004). It is assumed that the measurements taken from the perspective of the
participating routers and the overall environment as it converges new route updates was
an accurate reflection of the imposed changes to the routing process by the researcher.
For example, when the routing engine was modified to leverage the IPv6 headers in
carrying route attestation information, the overhead measurements were a direct result of
the changed process not coming from an external variable. To control this as best as
possible, a virtual environment with dedicated resources was used in a sandbox-type
setup. The study was based on open source implementations of the BGP routing
architecture for ease of manipulation when compared to proprietary or closed-source
solutions. With the open sourced implementations, the study assumed that they were
following the proper BGP-4 specifications and using a standardized approach to route
processing.
Scope, Limitations, and Delimitations
Scope
The scope of this study was to explore the feasibility of using an IPv6 oriented
model to perform route attestation while introducing minimal performance overhead to
participating devices. The study used a subset of virtual appliances running open source
BGP routing engines to process and enable route updates. The virtual appliances
combined with open source software in a controlled environment gave the researcher
control of variables being studied as external influences could be minimized in this type
of scheme. These virtual routing appliances were configured to use the same hardware
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resources, software versions, and configurations to ensure consistency across the devices.
The study was not scoped to evaluate the solutions on other hardware platforms, vendor
equipment, against routing protocols other than BGP-4, or closed-source software. The
rational for excluding the other solutions was that if all participating devices in BGP
properly follow the specification of the protocol, it is reasonable to believe that the rules,
processes, and procedures for processing BGP route information would be standardized.
The routing updates and traffic generated in the environment were controlled by the
researcher in an effort to identify if the proposed solution solved the sub-prefix hijacking
problem, and what the impact of that solution was. If the study were to use real BGP
traffic collected from nodes in the Internet, additional variables, complexities, external
influences, and difficulty in accurately identifying sub-prefix hijacking attacks would
introduced. These complexities would degrade the purity of the observations taken
during the study.
Limitations
Since a control group was not used, a limitation of this quasi-experimental beforeand-after study is that the results may not be completely conclusive in whole or in part.
This means that the changes discovered through the study possibly only revealed a true
change in part or in entirety. In this scenario, control groups were extremely difficult to
introduce into the study as variables may have changed between iterations of the
researcher’s intervention. Furthermore, if the subjects being studied are as close to
identical in nature as possible, the random selection of certain subjects is not necessary.
As Keppel and Wickens (2004) indicated, perfection is impossible as no two subjects can
be exactly the same. The goal in light of Keppel’s statement was to minimize any
nuisance variables and eliminate confusion that may cause comparisons to be skewed.
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Examples of nuisance variables in the study include: the load on the infrastructure
supporting the virtual environment may change, the systems could be processing different
tasks, etc. In addition, as Keppel and Wickens (2004) suggest with quasi-experimental
studies, the statistical methods do not pose much of a challenge in evaluating results. On
the other hand, the results need to be interpreted carefully as some incidental
characteristics in the group may affect the measurements.
The study was limited to capturing data from routers participating in a controlled
and segregated environment. This type of scenario does not allow for external
influences, multiple malicious actors, scalability, or as high of volumes of BGP traffic
that may be seen on the public Internet. Furthermore, as the BGP traffic was generated
and controlled by the researcher, it is expected that the BGP updates followed
specification and were not malformed. Malformed traffic may still introduce a change
into the BGP environment, but due to its unpredictability, it could not be accounted for
reasonably.
Delimitations
The data collected in this study originated from a pure IPv6 environment between
participating routers. Realistically on the Internet, there is a mix of IPv4 traffic and IPv6
traffic. A single network environment that has implementations of both the IPv4 and
IPv6 protocols within may be referred to as a “dual stack” network because it uses the
IPv4 stack alongside of the IPv6 stack. The two instantiations of the protocol are able to
communicate with different configurations such as 4to6 tunnels or ISATAP tunnels
alongside of many other tunneling technologies (Punithavathani & Radley, 2014). These
types of tunnels are designed to allow traffic existing in an IPv4 network to communicate
with hosts on an IPv6 network and vice versa through a single router (Horley, 2014).
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Effectively, one type of IP traffic may be encapsulated into the other, which could affect
the appearance of the BGP messages.
As the study focused on only virtual routers in an environment that is guarded
from external influences, the results may change when the same factors are applied to a
physical environment. Some factors that exist in a physical environment are not present
in the virtual space. While the study focused on the software aspects of BGP routing, it is
important to consider the physical aspects when the scope shifts to universal evaluations.
Closed-source software and proprietary vendor implementations of the BGP-4
protocol might not all be following the specification or standardization. This means that
they may process BGP messages differently than what was observed in this particular
environment, potentially introducing changes in the experiential results.
Additionally, the study was only focused on assessing the model in a VMware
ESXi virtualization platform. Other Hypervisors may treat the virtual routers differently,
impose limitations on CPU throughput, and process the data differently. If the exact
virtual appliances are imported into a different virtual environment, the outcomes could
change due to the aforementioned characteristics of hypervisors.
Summary
Chapter 1 provided the objectives necessary to navigate through a quasiexperimental before-and-after study. Evaluation of the deficiencies and potential impacts
of implementing a secure BGP implementation were investigated in this chapter (Butler
et al., 2010; Lychev et al., 2013; Ming, 2006). This chapter identified an opportunity for
further research to be performed in the IPv6 space as it may be used to better the security
posture of BGP (Butler et al., 2010). It identified the wide-spread usage of BGP (Jakub
et al., 2014) and those users as the stakeholders in the study. Furthermore, the chapter
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recognized the scientific and social impacts of the study, demonstrating significance of
the contributions to the field.
The theoretical framework of the study formed the basis for which the study was
to be conducted and was discussed in this chapter. It has been proven that IPv6 offers
efficiencies over its IPv4 counterpart (Lammle, 2013) and the movement towards IPv6
shows a positive trend in adoption rates (Jakub et al., 2014). Those efficiencies coupled
with highly adopted BGP security models (Gersch & Massey, 2013; Kent et al., 2000;
Wählisch, Maennel, & Schmidt, 2012) contributed to the theoretical framework.
Through the realized performance impacts of IPv6 and suggested models, the research
questions can be formulated and solutions evaluated.
The quasi-experimental before-and-after research design was adopted for this
study and was determined to be an effective instrument for evaluating the research
question (Kumar, 2005). The study was scoped and limitations or delimitations that may
affect the reproducibility or universality of the study were identified.
Chapter 2 encompasses a literature review that is an all-embracing summary of
the state of BGP security, proposed solutions, evaluation taxonomies, and resources
pertaining to performance penalties and their measurement. The literature review will
provide the background and base information required for the study. In addition, Chapter
2 will provide a historical overview of existing BGP security solutions, their
shortcomings, and any existing gaps in the literature addressed. Lastly, a surveying of
articles, journals, books, and additional research materials gathered for the study is
presented.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
Chapter 1 produced the topic of this dissertation: using IPv6 to perform BGP
route attestation and measuring the resulting overhead. The chapter also demonstrated
the significance of the study as it relates to the widespread usage of the BGP-4 protocol
and potential outcomes of compromised BGP traffic. Also included in Chapter 1 is the
study’s background, problem statement, significance, research questions, and research
design. Chapter 2 surveys the literature surrounding the study and provides insight into
the operation of BGP, supporting information on IPv6, network prefix context, existing
route attestation models, observation and inspection planes, and similar cryptographic
solutions. The chapter studies vulnerabilities in BGP as they relate to sub-prefix
hijacking as well as motivations and challenges with attribution to attackers. In
continuation, Chapter 2 will provide insight into the causes behind low adoption rates of
existing security solutions for BGP and the viewpoints of administrative domain
operators on the prioritization of adopting a security solution. Lastly, the literature
review will provide a means of measuring overhead in routing convergence and
cryptographic solutions to give way to measurements of the impact of the solution.
The purpose of the quasi-experimental study was to measure the impact of using
IPv6 in a model that performs BGP route attestation to defend against sub-prefix
hijacking attacks. Chapter 2 stages formerly proposed and currently implemented
solutions of BGP security models at the time of this study such as S-BGP (Kent et al.,
2000) and RPKI (Wählisch et al., 2012). Also, the chapter builds an area of observation
on what will make a security solution adoptable by evaluating studies of those who are to
implement them (Lychev et al., 2013).
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Design and Operation of BGP
Since its introduction in 1989 (Lougheed & Rekhter, 1989), BGP has evolved
through many changes into its current version, BGP-4. BGP offers Internet peers a way
to route information between each other without a central core; that is, they can make
decisions based on information gained from their neighbors. Subsequent releases of BGP
include BGP-2 (Kirk Lougheed & Yakov Rekhter, 1991) and BGP-3 (K Lougheed & Y
Rekhter, 1991) which contained refinements to the preceding protocol specifications.
BGP-4, the currently used version of BGP at the time of this research, was first seen on
the Internet in 1993, and refined through other Request for Comments (RFCs) including
RFC1771 in 1995 and RFC4271 in 2006 (G. Huston, Rossi, & Armitage, 2011). BGP
routing tables have grown in population alongside of the protocol as have the number of
participating devices since its introduction.
In the introduction of the Secure Border Gateway Protocol (S-BGP), Kent et al.
(2000) defined the security for BGP as the intended and truthful operation of BGP.
Kent’s description of secure operation also alluded to a need for route attestation. For
that reason, it was important to understand how BGP operates in an ideal environment.
The understanding of BGP’s normal operation and processing of functional messages
also revealed weaknesses in the design of the protocol that allow for attacks such as subprefix hijacking to be carried out.
At a high level, BGP has two main jobs: mapping an IP address prefix to an
autonomous system, and building paths between a specified source and a reachable
destination (Bruhadeshwar et al., 2011). A BGP speaking autonomous system is able to
advertise its ownership of a prefix by sending an update message to its neighboring peers.
When a peer receives an update message, it will recursively concatenate its own
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autonomous system number to the update and pass the newly formed update out to its
peers. The result of this concatenation and redistribution of update messages is that each
peer that receives the update will attain an association of a network prefix and a list of
autonomous systems that traffic will need to traverse to get to the prefix. The path
aggregation can be represented by the following formula (𝑃, [𝐴𝑆𝑘 𝐴𝑆𝑘−1 𝐴𝑆0 ) where P is
the network prefix, 𝐴𝑆0 is the origin of the route, and the other AS represent the nodes
along the path. It is critically important to the operation of BGP that these messages
retain their integrity while traversing the Internet (J. Israr et al., 2010). Additionally, since
an update is only able to specify a single path, only routers that also share that path may
be aggregated into the update message (Kent et al., 2000). When a router receives
multiple update messages for the same prefix, it will make a selection based on its
configuration and routing policies.
Kent et al. (2000) further defined the correct operation of BGP and associate
integrity, timeliness, and authenticity of BGP updates as functional requisites. To
recapitulate the idealized or correct operation of BGP as outlined (Kent et al., 2000), the
following statements are made:
•

Every BGP update received by a participating router is assumed to have
originated from the indicated peer; that is, it was not tampered with in
transit. This update is also expected to be more current than other
previously received routing information for prefixes from that peer. An
outdated update will have little use and may negatively affect operation of
BGP.

•

Each update is received by the intended recipient. The updates are not
redirected or lost in transit to the intended recipient.
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•

A BGP update will originate only from a peer that is authorized to act on
behalf of an autonomous system to advertise the routing information
contained within.

•

The owner of a network prefix was authorized by its parent organization to
state that it owns the prefix.

•

The first AS in the route is authorized to advertise the prefixes by the
owners of the address space.

•

Route withdrawal advertisements should originate from a peer that was
authorized to advertise the route before the withdrawal was issued.

•

The BGP peer that the update message is sent from should correctly apply
the information abiding by the BGP rules and policies in its configuration.
These rules and policies dictate how the route should be stored, updated,
or redistributed as well as if it should be selected or any information can
be derived from it.

•

Lastly, a recipient of a BGP update message should correctly apply the
rules and policies in its configuration as to whether or not the route should
be accepted.

The above statements concisely capture the intended operation of BGP. A deviation from
these rules indicate a failure in the proper operation and form the base from which the
vulnerabilities in the protocol stem.
One area that remained untouched from Kent’s rules on the correct BGP operation
is how a router processes or selects a route learned from an update. The selection of a
route is designed to determine the “best” announcement that can be subsequently
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advertised to peers. This process of determining what route is “best” happens through an
ordered system of evaluations summarized with the following selection routines (Junaid
Israr, 2012; Y Rekhter, Li, & Hares, 2006):
1. A route with a more specific (longer) address prefix is chosen over that of
a covering (smaller) address prefix for the same network blocks.
2. The route with the highest value for local-preference is selected. Localpreference is an attribute locally calculated by a recipient of a BGP update
message factoring in the locally configured policy.
3. Next, the route with the shortest AS_PATH attribute, a mandatory
attribute of BGP update messages. The AS_PATH represents a list or
sequence of autonomous systems that the update messages has traversed.
Effectively, a smaller number of autonomous systems to pass through is
preferred.
4. A route with the lowest multi-exit discriminator (MULTI_EXIT_DISC)
attribute will be chosen next. MULTI_EXIST_DISC is an optional
attribute in BGP update messages that gives a hint as to what the best path
is to an autonomous system with multiple entry points. A lower value for
this attribute indicates a more preferable path to choose.
5. If a route to a particular destination network also has an associated Interior
Gateway Protocol (IGP) with a lower cost to the next hop, it will be
chosen.
6. External Border Gateway Protocol (eBGP) routes are chosen over Internal
Border Gateway Protocol (iBGP) routes.
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7. Lastly, if iBGP must be used, the route with the lowest BGP identifier
value is chosen. A BGP identifier is a numeric representation of a BGP
speaker that matches an IP address assigned on that host. This value is
calculated on startup.
An understanding of the BGP’s intended operation and route selection process revealed
areas where the protocol exhibits weaknesses that can be exploited. For example, if a
router violates these properties by advertising a prefix that it is unauthorized to do so and
the illegitimate prefix is longer than existing routes for the covering prefix, a sub-prefix
hijacking attack can occur. By violating these properties, attackers are able to exploit the
protocol, as sufficient checks do not exist within the design of the protocol for such
deviation.
Distance Vector and Link-State Protocols
The determination of how a routing protocol selects the best path to a destination
can be used to classify the protocol into one of two categories: distance vector routing
protocols and link state routing protocols (Lammle, 2013). BGP is most closely related
to distance vector protocols in the way that it computes various paths to an intended
destination. BGP is sometimes referred to as a path-vector protocol. At a high level,
distance vector protocols such as BGP calculate a cost to each destination it knows about
and sends that cost as a vector to its neighbors. Essentially, distance vector protocols tell
neighboring routers what the world looks like from the standpoint of the originating
router (Zhao, 2002). On the other hand, link-state routing protocols operate slightly
differently and task participating routers to calculate their own best route to a destination
using metrics like link speed or availability. According to Zhao (2002), link-state routing
protocols flood information about what neighbors they see as raw information; they tell
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the world who the neighbors are. Since BGP operates in a space where route updates are
composed of aggregate information from an arbitrary number of routers, some of which
may not be trusted, it is much more difficult to detect invalid updates than if it used raw
routing information.
Vulnerabilities of BGP
Coupled with its age, BGP has several documented and known vulnerabilities that
exist within its design and operation that make it vulnerable protocol (Geoff Huston &
Michaelson, 2012). BGP has been attacked and compromised as seen in the previously
documented examples (Bornhauser & Martini, 2011; Sun et al., 2015; Yun & Song,
2015). Many of the vulnerabilities in BGP stem from three central areas. These areas
include the lack of transitive BGP authenticity, freshness, and validity mechanisms from
the source of the update through the end node receiving the message. Additionally, BGP
offers no solution to validate the authenticity of an advertised network prefix. Lastly,
BGP does not have any controls to validate that an update message has not been
tampered with throughout its travel or to verify the messages’ integrity. Other
researchers such as G. Huston et al. (2011) suggested additional vulnerabilities exist in
the design of BGP as it has no mechanism to verify its routing information base (RIB) is
accurate and up-to-date.
These vulnerabilities may be taken advantage of by malicious actors even
unintentionally introduced via misconfigurations. Outside of the neighbor establishment
and selection process of BGP, little is done to prevent an autonomous system from faking
their prefix ownership, intercepting and tampering with BGP update messages, or posing
as another autonomous system number. Either intentionally or accidentally, these
principles and flaws within BGP have the ability to significantly disrupt network
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resources if introduced. The following subsections will cover BGP vulnerabilities as they
pertain to outsider and insider threats, attacker incentives to target BGP, and the subprefix hijacking attack method.
Outsider and Insider Threats
By design, BGP operates in a heterogeneous environment, one that contains other
peers speaking BGP, but also different protocols such as OSPF and EIGRP. In this
environment, BGP will be impacted by decisions made inside and outside of an
autonomous system (Zhao, 2002). These two different vantage points raise different
concerns when assessing the level of access an administrator may have or what trust
relationships exist. Outsider threats to BGP may include a remote autonomous system
advertising invalid routing updates that can affect the reachability or integrity of traffic.
These types of threats may be actualized by using BGP or any of the other protocols
existing in the heterogeneous environment. Therefore, it can be stated that a routing
protocol such as BGP is only as secure as the weakest link. Insider threats can introduce
the same types of security concerns as outsiders, although they may be harder to detect
according to Zhao (2002). An insider may have a greater level of trust, access to private
cryptographic keys, and the ability to answer security inquiries correctly.
Incentives to Attack BGP
Since BGP’s introduction, the shift in mentality has moved from trusting internal
devices and assuming threats reside outside of the network to the realization that threats
exist both internally and externally. This paradigm has resulted in autonomous systems
operating in the BGP space to slip from the typical operation of BGP knowingly or
otherwise. While it is difficult or even impossible to determine the exact cause,
motivation, and intent for a malicious entity to leverage weaknesses in BGP for their own
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gain, previously documented attacks on BPG can shed some light onto the subject.
Junaid Israr (2012) asserted reasons relating to financial, technical limitations of address
space, misconfigurations, as well as political.
Economic and financial incentives may be enough incentive for an entity to
perform an attack against BGP. It is known that autonomous systems are typically
registered by an organization, some of which may be for-profit and competing
organizations (Junaid Israr, 2012). Since these organizations need to maintain an online
presence participation in BGP is often times necessary. An autonomous system
participating in BGP may falsely represent certain networks or destinations in favor of
those that are more economically favorable for them. In addition, if an entity is able to
intercept network traffic intended for another, they may be able to learn traffic patterns,
affect quality of service, or obtain proprietary/sensitive information.
Depletion of IPv4 addresses is a documented and well-known challenge facing
organizations with an online presence. Organizations have been allocated blocks of IP
addresses in the limited IPv4 space, and may have more available addresses than they are
using or intend to use (Geoff Huston & Bush, 2011). The scrutiny of these organizations
increases as the depletion of IPv4 addresses becomes more prominent. While IPv6
solutions do exist to the IPv4 limited address space, online partakers may use BGP to
illegally take over the unused IPv4 addresses.
Misconfigurations happen in many different ways, and BGP is not immune to the
effects of human error. A prime example of a misconfiguration in BGP affecting users
unintentionally was seen in the Pakistani YouTube incident (Bornhauser & Martini,
2011). While the state-owned ISP in Pakistan introduced a BGP update affecting the
YouTube prefix, it was accidentally advertised outwards towards the ISP’s neighbors.
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The invalid advertisement affected traffic intended for YouTube in certain regions
making it unreachable. The invalid route update was detected after only 5 minutes;
however, it took over two hours and the teamwork of multiple sites to fully restore access
to YouTube.
Man-in-the-Middle and denial of service (DoS) attacks can be initialized by
autonomous systems acting maliciously. An autonomous system owner may want to
intercept or black-hole network traffic for a variety of reasons. Some of the motivations
for performing such an attack could be security, surveillance, and other harmful intents.
In this type of an attack, an autonomous system would falsely identify the ownership or
best path to reach an intended destination such that network traffic would be misdirected
through their environment. Once the traffic enters the malicious entities environment, the
outcomes and degrees of impact are limitless.
Network Prefixes and Sub-Prefix Hijacking
Among the many vulnerabilities within BGP, this study focused primarily on subprefix hijacking attacks. These attacks take advantage of the BGP attribute referred to as
the “longest prefix match” property. An understanding of network prefixes or subnets is
required to understand the vulnerability, and how attackers are able to take advantage of
it. This section will outline network prefixes as they exist on the Internet and tie back to
the BGP longest-prefix match property.
In both IPv4 and IPv6, network IP addresses are representations of 32-bit and
128-bit binary numbers respectively. Human interaction with IP addresses is not
typically in the form of binary numbers; rather, the numbers are represented by decimal
in IPv4 and hexadecimal in IPv6 for ease of readability, memorization, and other ease-ofuse factors (Lammle, 2013). In an IPv4 address, the 32-bit binary number is divided out
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into four separate groups called octets. An octet represents eight binary bits converted
into a single integer. These four resulting octets (decimal numbers) are concatenated by
periods or dots, and the grouping of the octets is referred to as dotted-decimal notation
(Butler et al., 2010). Dotted-decimal notation is the common representation of an IPv4
address. For example, a network host address may be assigned the IP address of
192.168.1.1, which is the dotted decimal notation of the following binary sequence:
11000000101010000000000100000001. IPv6 addresses work much in the same way;
however, instead of 32 bits IPv6 uses 128 bits and represents the address as eight groups
of four hexadecimal digits per group with the groups separated by colons. An example
IPv6 address may look like the following: 2600:1014:b109:55f0:505a:d94f:203c:55f. It
is clear to see that the dotted-decimal notation or IPv6 notation is easier to work with than
a binary string from a human standpoint. Regardless of the representation or address
type, the underlying bits are very important to BGP when considering its longest prefix
match property.
IP addresses typically belong to a larger logical grouping of address space called a
subnet or a network prefix. For the remainder of the section, the following terms are
interchangeably used to represent network prefix: subnet, address group, network block
and address block. There are many ways to represent a network prefix in IPv4, but one
common method is Classless Interdomain Routing (CIDR) notation. CIDR is a method
for representing a network prefix by taking the first IP address in the network block,
appending a forward slash (/), and specifying how many bits of the address represent the
network (Fuller, Li, Yu, & Varadhan, 1993). For example, a prefix represented as
192.168.1.0/24 in CIDR notation, means that the first address in the network block is
192.168.1.0 and the first 24 bits (three octets or 192, 168, and 1) represent the network.

34
The remaining 8 bits or the fourth octet in this example can be used for hosts within the
network as their IP address.
On the public internet, organizations used to receive IP address blocks directly
from the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) who has offloaded such duties to
the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). The duties of
assigning IP address blocks has been further separated out in to regional registries that
also have the ability to delegate address block assignment in a hierarchical manner
(Butler et al., 2010). An example of a regional registry is the American Registry for
Internet Numbers (ARIN) who manages prefix assignment in North America. Due to the
hierarchical structure of IP address space assignment, it is possible that a network prefix
assigned to an organization will belong to a larger network prefix at a higher level. For
example, if an organization is assigned an address block such as 138.247.80.0/24, it may
have been delegated by the organization that maintains ownership of 138.247.0.0/16. In
this scenario, the shorter prefix 138.247.0.0/16 contains the longer prefix
138.247.80.0/24, and is called a cover network. By design of the BGP protocol, if both
networks were to exist in a routing table, BGP will look for the route with the longest or
more specific prefix in making its routing decision according to Butler et al. (2010). This
property and design are what allows for sub-prefix hijacking, where a malicious entity
may advertise longer network prefixes knowing that they are more likely to be used by
BGP.
Survey of Cryptographic Solutions in BGP
A survey of existing BGP security mechanisms brought to light different
cryptographic solutions that have been implemented to address vulnerabilities within the
protocol. These solutions aim to enhance the security of BGP by providing for
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authentication and protection against the interception and tampering of BGP updates in
transit. This section will give an overview of popular solutions while evaluating their
characteristics in ease of use and added overheard including the following: pairwise
keying, hash functions, message authentication codes (MAC), Diffie-Hellman key
negotiation, public key infrastructure (PKI), public key cryptography, route attestations
with certificates, and IPsec.
Pairwise Keying
Pairwise keying is a cryptographic solution intended to provide for authentication
between neighboring nodes. Two nodes or in this case, BGP routers, will establish a
shared secret key prior to exchanging route updates (López & Zhou, 2008). While
pairwise keying does allow for authentication between nodes, the key management
process introduces a significant amount of overhead. Butler Butler et al. (2010) asserted
that the runtime or complexity of pairwise key management can be described as Ο(𝑛 2 ).
This affects scalability and overall management particularly when implemented in largescale BGP on the Internet. Furthermore, if keys are not frequently changed, they are
subject to exposure through cryptanalysis and disclosure amongst personnel that know
the secret keys (Butler et al., 2010).
Hash Functions
Digest algorithms or cryptographic hash functions aim to provide a check for
message integrity in BGP security solutions The idea of a hash function is that input text
is used as a seed to perform some mathematical computation resulting in a unique,
nonreversible signature (Al-Hamami, 2014). As Al-Hamami (2014) noted, these hash
functions can be described as a one-way function as the resulting signature cannot be
used to obtain the original input text. Common hashing functions seen in BGP security
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include the Message-Digest 5 (MD5) algorithm (Rivest, 1992) as well as those in the
Secure Hashing Algorithm (SHA) classification (Gutierrez, Gallagher, & Director, 2008),
especially SHA-1 (Junaid Israr, 2012). A faulting property of hash functions is that two
sets of input text may produce the same output hash message; this property is called a
collision. When referring to the strength of a hashing algorithm, strength describes the
difficulty in using the hash to obtain the original text without running into collisions
(Butler et al., 2010). More complex hashing algorithms typically introduce higher levels
of computational overhead in comparison to their weaker counterparts.
Message Authentication Codes (MAC)
Message Authentication Codes (MAC) are used in BGP security to provide for
integrity checking of a message as well as authenticity for the sending node (Al-Hamami,
2014). Authorized or participating parties should have access to a shared secret key.
This key along with the message are fed into a mathematical computation to produce the
MAC. When the sending node issues an update or BGP message, the MAC is typically
appended to the tail end of the message. A receiving node that also has access to the
secret key will compute its own MAC based off the message. If the two MACs match,
then the recipient can know that the sender had access to the key (authentication) and the
message has not been tampered with in transit (integrity). MAC used by TCP MD5 is
often considered too weak due to the cryptographic shortcomings in the MD5
specification while those that incorporate hash functions such as SHA are considered
more secure (Jethanandani, Patel, & Zheng, 2013).
Diffie-Hellman Key Negotiation
There are undoubtedly some issues with pairwise-keying, especially when
considering the computational management overhead. For that reason, it is important to
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have an efficient way for routers to learn about each other’s’ keys to be comparatively
more scalable. The Diffie-Hellman key exchange is a way for two parties with no prior
knowledge of each other to exchange a shared secret key (Rescorla, 1999) At a high
level, the key exchange works by each participating party generating a private and public
key. One party will generate a number based off a combination of their own private key
and the other party’s public key. The result will be that each party will have
computationally generated the same number, which is then used as a key-encryption key
in the encryption of data. Effectively, capturing prior messages between the two parties
does not give any insight into how to generate or guess the keys, making the shared secret
more secure (Butler et al., 2010).
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
One of the significant challenges in pair-wise keying when used in a large-scale
environment such as BGP on the Internet is the distribution of keys. In pair-wise keying,
neighboring nodes need to agree upon shared keys and exchange them via some
mechanism. This method does not scale well as it requires more intervention of the
network administrators. There is an estimated 35,000 nodes participating in BGP (Butler
et al., 2010), thus highlighting the need for scalability. Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
approaches the problem slightly differently, but in a more scalable way. Rather than
nodes relying upon shared secret keys, each node will generate a private key along with a
public key. The public keys are distributed via the Public Key Infrastructure and are
available to participating nodes without manual intervention (Junaid Israr, 2012). These
key-pairs are then used in place of shared keys during the generation of cryptographic
messages. PKI solutions allow for a hierarchical distribution of pubic keys, which helps
with efficient distribution and scalability of the system. As Butler et al. (2010) indicated,
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there is ongoing research as to using a trusted authority like the IANA to serve as a top
hierarchical node in PKI for BGP.
Public Key Cryptography
BGP sub-prefix hijacking solutions can be separated into two broad encompassing
categories: cryptography-based and non-cryptography based (Zheng, Ji, Pei, Wang, &
Francis, 2007). In a cryptographic solution, a BGP router must sign and verify either the
autonomous system origin or the advertised BGP path. This type of solution has the
ability to perform immediate validation and verification of route updates as soon as they
are received, but the cryptographic functions introduce overhead that can have significant
detrimental impacts on router performance. On the other hand, non-cryptographic
solutions often require changes to the router software or additional attributes to be
appended to the BGP updates to assist in the detection of invalid or malicious updates.
Numerous types of models exist that attempt to validate route updates coming
from peers using strong public key cryptography (M. Zhao, S. W. Smith, & D. M. Nicol,
2005). The central idea of using public key cryptography in validating BGP route
updates hinges around each router in an autonomous system digitally signing each piece
of information it adds into the route path. When an update is received by a peer, the peer
router will then cryptographically validate each of the signatures accompanying the
added path data (Butler et al., 2010). According to M. Zhao et al. (2005) introducting
cryptography in such a manner has several costs associated with it in terms of generating
the signatures, processing the routing path and validating the signatures within the path,
and also checking the certificate status to determine if the signing party is still validated.
The result from this is larger route updates, slower convergence time, and increases the
storage and processing requirements of each participating device.
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Cryptography has been analyzed in a number of different applied solutions
including attestations. Within cryptography as it relates to BGP security models typically
two schemes can be used: asymmetric keys and symmetric keys. In a pair-wise scheme
where two neighboring autonomous systems have no prior knowledge of each other the
participating parties agree upon a key ahead of time in an offline manner; the trust that
they share is then based upon this key (Butler et al., 2010). Lee, Leung, Wong, Cao, and
Chan (2007) demonstrated that pairwise keying is often not scalable due to the manual
interaction required between parties to update and maintain key pairs. The complexity of
this type of key management according to Butler et al. (2010) is 𝑂(𝑛 2 ) in the number of
peers. Conversely, asymmetric key models require more computing in key generation,
but key management is greatly simplified and more scalable (Butler et al., 2010).
Attestations with Certificates
As previously discussed, route attestation shows that an autonomous system is
authorized to advertise a prefix and proves that the autonomous system owns the prefix as
well. The IANA is the root authority for delegating the ownership of address blocks to
autonomous systems, and those autonomous systems can further delegate the ownership
of smaller portions of the blocks (Butler et al., 2010). Attestation or validation of the
owners of a prefix are traceable back up the hierarchical structure back to the root.
In order for a participating router to perform attestation in proposed solutions, the
PKI is used to obtain the public keys needed for attestation. The key is often times
accessed using digital certificates that are issued by a trusted certificate authority.
Certificates contain the public key along with a signature indicating the ownership and
validity of the information contained within (Junaid Israr, 2012). According to Butler et
al. (2010), due to the way that certificates are delegated in a hierarchical structure, they
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can often be traced back to a trusted root authority much in the same way that attestations
can be traced.
IPsec
Many BGP messages are transmitted over the TCP protocol, which protects
against faults that may cause packets to be received out of order, lost, or replayed on a
network. TCP by itself does not protect the integrity or provide authentication. This is a
common problem within protocols that talk over TCP and exists within the way BGP
operates as well. In an attempt to provide integrity checking and authentication between
BGP peers, some solutions have looked to IPsec to provide the desired functionality
(Butler et al., 2010; Kent et al., 2000). IPsec is a suite of protocols that are able to
provide security at the network layer of communications by providing methods for
encrypting and authenticating IP headers according to Butler et al. (2010). In addition to
encrypting and authenticating IP headers, IPsec also provides methods for key
management between peers to help with the establishment and maintenance of secret
keys.
IPsec is seen in many secure scenarios such as implementing Virtual Private
Networks (VPNs) or providing end-to-end security between nodes. IPsec is also
standardized in IPv6, although it is not necessarily required. If it is properly configured,
IPsec has the ability to provide certain protections against network attacks such as replays
or man-in-the-middle scenarios. In fact, Butler et al. (2010) asserted that IPsec is the
most comprehensive solution when compared to other popular ones such as MD5
Integrity (Heffernan, 1998) and the General TTL Security Mechanism (GTSM) (V. Gill,
Heasley, Meyer, Savola, & Pignataro, 2004) although it may have a higher cost.
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Despite the advantages and protections that IPsec offers, it may not be suitable for
protecting a BGP update message throughout its entire transit. In BGP there are four
types of control messages: open, update, keepalive, and notification (Y Rekhter et al.,
2006). The message types of open, keepalive, and notification are unique because they
occur between two nodes and are not forwarded to other peers. The update message on
the other hand is more characteristic of a broadcast message in the sense that a BGP
speaking router may forward a single update message to multiple destinations.
Bruhadeshwar et al. (2011) stated that in such a case, update messages cannot be
protected solely through IPsec due to their broadcast-like nature. Furthermore, as routers
process update messages and append their path, they must modify the contents of the
message, which poses additional challenges for IPsec. Bruhadeshwar et al. (2011) also
identified IPsec as an appropriate security mechanism for query and answer sessions,
which may be leveraged in route attestation.
In contrast to IPv4 where it was an add-on to the protocol, IPsec exists and is built
into IPv6 as a standard and mandatory feature (Lammle, 2013). In addition to being built
into IPv6, IPsec does share many attributes with its IPv4 counterpart. For example,
applications may still chose between two different supporting protocols including
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) and Authentication Headers (AH) (Shue, Gupta, &
Myers, 2007). To facilitate the establishment and periodic refresh of the cryptographic
keys, IPsec leverages the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) protocol (Harkins & Carrel,
1998). According to Shue et al. (2007), when analyzing the performance of IPsec, IKE
typically accounts for most of the overhead in the protocol compared to supporting
protocols like ESP. However, when a significant number of packets are being processed,
the relationship may invert and IKE will account for less overhead. As overhead may

42
impact adoption rates of protocols, this relationship needs to be taken into account when
implementing IPsec.
IPv6 Extension Headers
In addition to IPsec, IPv6 has additional properties that may assist with
performing route attestation. According to Lammle (2013) among the many
improvements in the IPv6 protocol over IPv4 are extension headers. IPv4 has been
adapted and added on to many times since its introduction. Due to its longevity, certain
requirements that protocols have were simply not thought of in the original design of
IPv4 such as IPsec. Therefore, the complicated add-ons and compensations that exist to
give IPv4 the required functionality make certain implementations more difficult to use
and negatively impact the efficiency of the protocols (Lammle, 2013).
IPv6 extension headers are one of the improvements added into the specification.
They are described as any header following the initial 40 bytes of the packet that also
precedes the packet’s upper-layer header (Carpenter & Jiang, 2013). These extension
headers are intended to be used by the originating node to send information and are not
processed by any intermediary nodes along the path until the packet reaches its
destination (Deering, 1998). This is an important property of the extension headers as
Carpenter and Jiang (2013) noted, it allows for nodes without understanding of the header
to continue passing the information along. Compatibility with the use of the extension
headers is then required on the sending and final destination nodes.
When looking at IPv6 extension headers in the lens of performing route
attestation for BGP, the Authentication Header stands out as particularly interesting. The
Authentication header has the ability to provide integrity and origin authentication for
packets traversing an IPv6 connection (Kent, 2005). These two properties combined with
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another that will account for correctness of an update can feasibly be combined to
perform attestation. In addition, since the Authentication header is built into the IPv6
protocol, the overhead can be examined in comparison to solutions who rely on external
sources of authentication.
Existing Route Attestation Models
This section provides an investigation into existing route attestation models that
have been introduced and studied to provide authorization and validation of BGP route
updates. The literature review of these models is intended to objectively highlight crucial
strengths and weaknesses of the models. The lack of models pertaining specifically to
IPv6 is an important issue in the area as IPv6 adoption has been slow to adoption but
increasing as IPv4 space is exhausted. The existing models address BGP version 4 of the
protocol that is the same version used in IPv6, so relevant information is gained from this
exploration in terms of challenges, future study, impacts, and implementations of these
models. The literature review of existing route attestation models will include both
control plane and data plane prevention taxonomies as well as the following proposed
solutions: Secure BGP (S-BGP), RPKI, Secure Origin BGP (soBGP), and ROVER.
Control Plane and Data Plane Prevention Taxonomies
Many of the BGP solutions proposed aim to ensure that BGP sends and receives
control messages such as updates and route withdrawals properly. This focus places the
solutions into the control plane of the protocol (Butler et al., 2010). The control plane in
BGP handles the logic of keeping an updated router information base (RIB) that
maintains adjacencies of neighboring networks (Vissicchio et al., 2013). Most detection
methods for BGP sub-prefix hijacking reside in the control plane according to Zheng et
al. (2007). By the nature of BGP convergence and the control plane’s responsibility for
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determining a path to a given destination (Schuchard et al., 2010), sub-prefix hijacking
attacks directly affect the control plane.
In BGP, the data plane is slightly abstracted from the control plane in that its
intended purpose is to handle the actual transmission and forwarding of packets that can
contain route update and other BGP messages (Schuchard et al., 2010). Certain models
have been proposed to measure metrics in the data plane about the distance and
reachability of remote networks learned through BGP (Zheng et al., 2007). The data
plane has visibility into metrics such as hop-count and similarity between autonomous
system paths that form the foundation of Zheng’s model. This type of model requires
numerous systems distributed throughout the BGP domain in order to form a
comprehensive and accurate view of the stable routing environment.
Questions arise as to whether or not BGP can be secured entirely in the control
plane or the data plane. It is often seen only security one element of a protocol or system
that has numerous mechanism may actually reveal additional vulnerabilities within that
protocol (G. Huston et al., 2011). If one secures only the control plane, they may assume
that the BGP speaker can trust the autonomous system path it receives in a BGP update.
However, without also securing the data plane the actual transmission of the data may
still be susceptible to being sent down an untrusted path via the data plane. G. Huston et
al. (2011) suggested that there is a law of diminishing return that applies when adding
incremental security features in such a scenario the added benefit in light of the
complexity tapers off as well.
S-BGP
One frequently rerenced model is the Secure Border Gateway Protocol (S-BGP)
designed by Kent et al. (2000). The S-BGP model uses public keys as a new path

45
attribute and introduces IPSec into the route update process. At a high level, this model
works on two PKI’s: one for IP address allocation and the other for the assignment of
autonomous systems and router associations wihtin those routers. Through the use of
certificates, address/route attestations, and IPSec the authors of S-BGP were able to
migitate certain vulnerabilities within BGP including sub-prefix hijacking. S-BGP has
been refered to as the most comprehenssive solution for protecting against BGP attacks
(Gersch & Massey, 2013). However, there were significant performance impacts wihtin
the implementation when considering processing, transmission bandwidth, storage and
memory on the routers with the latter two being the largest issue. Accoridng to M. Zhao
et al. (2005), these implications are a contributing reason to the solution not being
implemented wide-spread.
RPKI
RPKI is a model that was developed by the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF) in an effort to secure BGP and interdomain routing implementations (Wählisch et
al., 2012). Similar to S-BGP, RPKI uses a certificate hierarchy to create relationships
between autonomous systems and gives them the authority to authorize the origin of
route updates. A limitation of this particular model is it does not take into account a
malicious entity may spoof their autonomous system and then perform attacks such as
sub-prefix hijacking. Adoption of RPKI is relatively low and is estimated to authroize
only 4% of the Internet’s routes (Malhotra & Goldberg, 2014). RPKI is an important
model to study because it is gaining the most traction in implementation (Goldberg,
2014).
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soBGP
A third proactive, cryptographic solution that has been introduced and studied is
Secure Origin BGP (soBGP). Through it’s design, soBGP implements certificates to
address specific questions related to secure routing objectives. These questions help a
router identify a peer transmitting an update and determine their key, define
authorization, discover peer routers, and control what should be done with a route update.
Although the protocol is not specifally designed to defend against any one attack, it does
by nature prevent sub-prefix hijacking attacks as the maliciuos entity would not be
authorized to inject such a route into BGP (White, 2003). An advantage of soBGP over
S-BGP is that it does not require encryption mechanism to be run directly on the router;
the encryption processing can take place elsewhere. This design should reduce the
overhead and negative impacts of requiring router to perform all of the cryptographic
functions.
ROVER
ROVER much like S-BGP, soBGP, and RPKI is another model that successfully
can mitigate sub-prefix hijacking attacks and like RPKI securely maps an autonomous
system to a subnet (Malhotra & Goldberg, 2014). ROVER operates slightly different
than RPKI and bases its functinality off of an already adopted standard reverse-DNS
(rDNS) rather than heavy modification to an exsting infrastructure. Using a trusted DNS
server, an autonomous system can register their ownership of address blocks through the
use of a new Secure Route Origin (SRO) DNS record. This would allow routers
receiving a BGP update to validate that the origination point of the udpate was authorized
to do so.
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Each of these solutions share similar characterisitcs in the sense that they are
based on some form of public key infrastructure which is used to assist in the route
attestation. Furthermore, each of the models are proactive in that they validate routes
recived immediately before allowing changes to be made to a router’s routing table.
They can be classified as a proactive cryptographic prevention solution operating in the
data-plane.
Adoption of Existing BGP Route Attestation Models
Regardless of the type of model, proposed solutions to improve the BGP security
posture against sub-prefix hijacking attacks remain largely unadopted. Considering the
massive scale of the Internet and autonomous systems within, it is impractical to make a
clean cutover to where all participating BGP speakers adopt a more secure
implementation. This type of change would require thousands of organizations who are
not governed by a central authority to adopt new standards that may not work well unless
a large portion of the organizations adopt them (Goldberg, 2014). This is similar to the
scenario of IPv6 and DNSSEC (Herzberg & Shulman, 2013) on the Internet; even though
the protocols offer distinct advantages over their predecessors, the Internet is slow to
adopt them as it creates additional work, computational overhead, and may force systems
to be upgraded. The advantages do not outweigh the accompanying burden in some
administrative domains.
With the global scale of BGP and the aforementioned lack of regulation on the
adoption of new secure protocols, a solution will need to be able to work in a partial
deployment. Realistically, this introduced the assumption that while a secure BGP
solution is operating in partial deployment, an autonomous system may need to accept
legacy or insecure routes from destination networks that do not participate (Lychev et al.,
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2013). The research performed by Lychev et al. suggested that even partial deployments
of secure BGP instances could improve the overall nature of interdomain routing in
certain scenarios depending on the hierarchical level of the implementing autonomous
system.
Since securing BGP and implementing improvements to the protocol will require
each autonomous system to make the adaptation, one should understand how autonomous
system operators prioritize secure routes. Lychev et al. (2013) surveyed 100 autonomous
system operators on how they prioritize secure routes over insecure routes and classified
them into three models. The three models included:
1. Security 1st where secure routes are always preferred over insecure routes.
2. Security 2nd where a secure route is preferred over an insecure route if it is
calculated to be less costly route is available.
3. Security 3rd where a secure route is preferred over an insecure route if and
only if a less costly and shorter insecure route does not exist. This means
that the secure route must be the shortest and have the least cost associated
with it to be chosen.
Lychev et al. determined through their survey that the security 1 st model was least
popular in a partial deployment scenario while the security 3rd model was the most
popular among autonomous system operators. The operators of those autonomous
systems cited the risk of lost revenue and uncertainty of the adaptation as contributing
factors for choosing security 3rd. Nonetheless, a secure BGP protocol in partial
deployment was found to contribute to the overall security of routing updates
demonstrating the feasibility of such application.
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The scale of the Internet is global and it continually changes and becomes a
denser, richer environment. This property of the Internet makes it infeasible to have a
“flag day” where all participating autonomous systems may adopt a new transition to
any technology including those that secure BGP (G. Huston et al., 2011). The result of
this will be a piecemeal deployment of any solution where the idea of a transition period
becomes an ongoing or indefinite factor.
In addition to issues faced with autonomous system operators electing to adopt a
secure BGP standard and the scale of the Internet, there are also technical implications
imposed by many of the solutions that may be a barrier to the option of security
enhancements. Cryptographic solutions may require the routers to implement crypto
hardware accelerators or absorb the performance penalty in terms of hardware overhead
(Goldberg, 2014). There is clearly a tradeoff between solutions that perform address
proof validation offline and those that attempt to do it in real-time using cryptographic
solutions(M. Zhao et al., 2005). Other solutions require modifications the actual update
messages and come with their own challenges in updating router operating to
acknowledge the changes. As G. Huston et al. (2011) concluded in their survey of BGP
security solutions, there is a cost in improving no matter the solution; security needs to
become an essential part of BGP rather than a desirable property.
Measuring Overhead in Routing and Cryptography
As overhead is a limiting factor in the adoption rates of BGP security solutions, it
is important to understand and measure sources of overhead. Routers have a finite
amount of resources when considering time for a routing table to fully converge, the size
of the routing table, as it is stored in memory on the router, processing load, and scaling
capability of the protocol. The first metrics including convergence time, memory
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consumption, and CPU consumption are easily measured quantitatively and can be used
to measure the impact of security enhancements to BGP. The last metric mentioned by
G. Huston et al. (2011), scaling capability, is much more difficult or even impractical to
measure as the scale of the Internet and its volatile nature introduce many variables; thus
scalability is a metric that is largely understood in its fullest extent. These same metrics
and associated measurements are used by the authors of S-BGP to evaluate performance
and operational issues as well (Kent et al., 2000). S-BGP is often touted as the most
comprehensive BGP security proposal to date (M. Zhao et al., 2005) which builds the
importance of these measurements.
Routing table convergence times are another factor that comes up in the
measurement and the impact of proposed BGP security solutions. Route convergence is
the measurement of time from when a routing update is sent and when participating
routers settle on a stable route (Dan et al., 2002). This is an especially important property
of BGP as changes in the Internet topology need to be replicated out quickly. If there are
large delays from when a topology change takes place and when all routers in the BGP
space are aware of the new stable route, networks may effectively become unreachable to
certain autonomous systems. The very purpose of a routing protocol is to provide quick
adaptive changes in an evolving topology to ensure reachability of systems.
Existing Infrastructure as Functional Components
BGP speaking routers need a way to look up the ownership of a subnet in order to
determine if an advertised route it authorized. As Gersch and Massey (2013) indicated
through their research, DNS and reverse-DNS are already deployed in a global scale, are
well understood, and have had significant amounts of testing. Reverse-DNS (rDNS)
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serves as a platform for resolving an IP address into a domain name, thus attributing
ownership of the IP address (Howard, 2015).
The naming conventions of a proposed solution for leveraging rDNS to attribute
network prefix ownership need to follow a standardized approach to ease adoption.
Multiple naming conventions have been proposed to address this (Eidnes, de Groot, &
Vixie, 1998; Gersch & Massey, 2013; Thomson, Huitema, Ksinant, & Souissi, 1995). By
and large, solutions proposed by the IETF (Thomson et al., 1995) have become the
standard and are widely adopted.
One problem with using DNS or any central authority is an attacker may be able
to spoof the origin of the message making it appear that it has originated from a trusted
location. This type of problem is particularly relevant when observing email
communications (Delany, 2006). Delany’s DomainKeys (Delany, 2007) solution is built
around the principal that if a recipient of an email can irrefutably determine the
origination point of an email and whether or not that source was authorized to do so,
granular filtering and acceptance policies can be applied. This draws a parallel to a
recipient of a BGP route update. If that recipient was able to determine beyond doubt the
origination of an update and if that source was authorized to do so, sub-prefix hijacking
attacks will be easy to detect in nature.
DomainKeys is a solution that relies heavily upon DNS to store and distribute
cryptographic keys (Delany, 2007). The cryptographic signatures are used as a method of
signing and authenticating the origination of a message. From the cryptographic
authentication system an authorization system can be developed. In the case of this
research, the authorization component builds from the previously discussed rDNS model.
DomainKeys have been frequently discussed by the IETF (Crocker, Hansen, &
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Kucherawy, 2011; Hansen & Hallam-Baker, 2009) and are further developing increased
adoption rates.
Summary
The research studied in Chapter 2 provided an overall viewpoint of the state of
BGP security and identified properties of a successful BGP security model. An
examination of existing route attestation models is performed to identify existing factors
that contribute to the adoptability or lack thereof in such models. Through validity
testing and measurements of overhead presented in the reviewed literature, similar
methodologies will be utilized in Chapter 3. Route attestation methods are further
evaluated by studying the research presented to determine the routing plane in which a
successful route attestation model may operate. Finally, methods of effectively weighing
performance implications in terms of overhead in routing and cryptographic solutions are
studied in an effort to provide consistent measurements and common understanding of
the proposed solution.
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODS
Chapter 2 surveyed literature that applies to the background of this research study.
The purpose of this study was to evaluate the performance implications on a router
participating in a model where IPv6 extension headers are used to perform BGP route
update attestation. In the following sections, Chapter 3 will present the research methods
that will be used in this proposed research study. Furthermore, the chapter will both
discuss and justify how the model is apposite to the study. Lastly, important details
surrounding the research method will be presented including: design of model, data
collection methods, instrumentation, legitimacy, dependability and data analysis methods.
Research Method and Design Appropriateness
Quasi-experimental design is intended to investigate what effect a treatment has
on an outcome variable (Salkind, 2010) where participants are not randomly assigned.
Furthermore, according to Balasubramanian, Raman, and Selvakumar (2013), beforeand-after studies are designed to be used when a researcher is able to establish a before
observation prior to any interventions are introduced into the sample population. This
negates the need for a researcher to retroactively reconstruct the before observations. In
essence, a quasi-experimental before-and-after study is designed to measure the resulting
effects of an intervention on a non-randomly assigned study group. This will take into
account the measurement of primary variables as they relate to the hypothesis.
The proper identification of a research method is crucial to designing a research
study. According to Salkind (2010), quantitative research methodologies are commonly
used in scientific investigations of quantifiable properties and their relationships. On the
other hand, qualitative research methodologies are often found in social and human
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studies where resulting data is a representation of general themes or interpretations from
the study (Creswell, 2009). Although quantitative and qualitative research methodologies
do produce different types of results, Salkind (2010) indicated that the methodologies
should not be antithetical. In fact, due to necessity, many research processes contain
aspects of both quantitative and qualitative methods. In this study, quantitative data was
used primarily to describe the performance implications of using IPv6 extension headers
in a BGP route attestation model.
In the light of BGP being the only routing protocol across the public Internet that
facilitates the exchange of routing information between autonomous systems such as
ISPs, performance is an important measurement. The nature of this study, as described in
Chapter 1, was to numerically measure the performance impacts of routers participating
in an IPv6 BGP route attestation model compared to routers not participating in the
model. Since several studies have been performed to measure similar metrics in IPv4
BGP attestation models using quantitative methods (Biersack et al., 2012; Kent et al.,
2000; M. Zhao et al., 2005), this study also used quantitative methods to measure the
resulting performance impacts. The chosen quantitative methodologies provided
numerical insight into the relationship being studied with statistical analysis on observed
results.
Quantitative data results in numeric values that can be measured and used to test
the effects of researcher intervention (Kumar, 2005). The researcher intervention in this
study was the introduction of the attestation model where the BGP routing process was
modified to verify route updates. Numeric values obtained through quantitative research
allows researchers to understand the performance and scalability of software systems
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(Liu, 2009). To better define the scope of this study, numeric results were analyzed
rather than broad generalizations that may be seen in qualitative work.
According to Creswell (2009) the selection of a research design methodology
takes into account a few factors including the type of data being collected, analysis of the
data, and interpretation of the results. Despite research being a mix of methods, this
study aligned most closely with quantitative research. From within the quantitative
research category, a researcher must understand the available methodologies when
determining the design appropriateness.
Creswell (2009) further classified quantitative research into two methods of
inquiry: survey and experimental, while Salkind (2010) also suggested correlational
research and casual-comparative research. Although different variations of these
methods of inquiry exist to describe relationships between variables, experimental
research was the most appropriate for this study. Experimental research aligns with the
purpose and nature of this study as there was at least one independent variable that
received intervention while other dependent variables were measured. These variables
represented the participation in the model, performance impacts, and scalability as
described in subsequent sections.
Survey-based research is intended to generalize opinions, trends, or attitudes via
structured interviews or questionnaires (Creswell, 2009). Due to the highly technical
nature of this research, survey-based research was not suitable as there were not humansubjects being studied or intervened with in the research. Furthermore, the intent and
data gathered from survey-based research represents descriptive data about the current
status of variables within the study (Salkind, 2010) as opposed to the relationship
between variables through descriptive statistical analysis.
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Correlational research is another similar option in research design to experimental
research. According to Salkind (2010), correlational research does have the ability to
show relationships between variables and is limited by the lack of randomness in
participants. However, correlational research aims to describe these relationships
between variables in naturally occurring situations as opposed to experimental design.
Experimental design is the process where a researcher intervenes or acts upon variables
seeking an outcome. Therefore, correlational research was not suitable for this study
because the variables were not naturally occurring.
Casual-comparative or ex post facto research is a third research approach that falls
within the quantitative research scope. Casual-comparative studies measure differences
within existing or established groups (Salkind, 2010). This type of research also
examines the groups from a retrospective lens in the sense that the events within the
groups have already occurred. As a result, of the events occurring in the past, any
variable manipulation is impossible, making this approach inappropriate for the study.
In contrast, experimental research focuses on whether or not a specific treatment
results in an influenced outcome. Taking into account the goals and data collection
methods described by Creswell (2009), this study used an experimental research strategy.
This strategy allowed for researcher intervention and variable manipulation as well as
control of the groups being studied.
Within the experimental research strategy, Salkind (2010) identified two subcategories: true experimental research, and quasi-experimental research. True
experimental research requires that participants be randomly selected and placed into
either control or experimental groups prior to the researcher’s intervention. Random
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selection is beneficial as it can provide for proper casual relationships between dependent
and independent variables (Salkind, 2010).
On the other hand, quasi-experimental research differs from true experimental
research as the researcher may not or should not randomly assign participants to control
and experimental groups. While quasi-experimental studies cannot show a true cause and
effect as a result, they can be used to show relationships between variables (Salkind,
2010). This study was not being performed in a production or live environment, rather
the study focused on a simulated and highly controlled environment. The simulated
environment provided consistency amongst the attribute variables as they could not be
actively changed or controlled Kumar (2014) and further eliminated outside influences on
them. In the proposed environment, if all participants were identical, or duplicates of
each other, the randomization of an experimental study was not needed. In this case,
since technical objects were being studied and originated from copies of a master
template, they were as close to identical as possible. A benefit of randomization is the
allowance of all participants to have an equal an independent chance of being in a control
or experimental group (Creswell, 2009). This state of randomization or the lack thereof
is what dictated that a quasi-experimental study was most appropriate in this scenario.
Lastly, the researcher needs to take into account the nature of the study when
defining an experimental investigation. There are three scopes in which a researcher may
look at the study’s nature. The first being an experimental study where the researcher
intervenes introducing an effect and measuring an outcome or the cause. On the opposite
end of the spectrum, a researcher may observe the outcome of an intervention and try to
determine the effect; this is known as non-experimental. Additionally, there exists a
hybrid of the two approaches known as semi-experimental where a researcher
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retrospectively associates the effects with outcomes. These three definitions given by
Kumar (2005) further clarified why this study was an experimental study in nature as
opposed to non-experimental or semi-experimental.
Research Question, Hypothesis, and Variables
This study aimed to measure the extent of the relationship between routers
participating in a BGP model to perform route attestation with IPv6 headers and the
resulting performance impacts. The research question which guided the study is: In a
model where IPv6 extension headers are used to successfully perform route attestation of
BGP updates, what is the resulting degree of difference exists in terms of router CPU
utilization percentage, RAM utilization percentage, route convergence time, and BGP
update packet size in comparison to a router not participating in the model? This
research question was answered through a systemic gathering and analysis of numerical
data obtained from the participating routes.
The hypothesis is a statement of predictions about the relationships among
variables that the researcher intends to ascertain (Creswell, 2009). As previously
described, the hypothesis for this study was: Given a model designed to perform
lightweight route attestation, necessary information needed to perform the attestation
may be carried inside of IPv6 extension headers within constraints defined by the
protocol specification without imparting performance overhead. This hypothesis guided
the study and shaped the variables, data collection methods, and analysis of results.
Population
In an effort to align with goals of quasi-experimental research design, the routers
that composed the population were as similar as possible. Virtual machines are software
instantiations of computers that run operating systems and applications (Patterson &
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Hennessy, 2013). Virtual machines are backed by physical hardware on a host referred to
as a hypervisor or virtual machine manager (VMM). The relationship between a
hypervisor and a virtual machine is that the hypervisor or “host” provides the physical
resources needed for the virtual machine referred to as the “guest”. To facilitate creating
a group of similar routers to be studied, virtual machines were used, as they are easily
copied and duplicated. The duplication of a single virtual machine into a larger group of
virtual machines produced a population with an extremely similar identity between all
routers.
The virtual machines used in the study were running pfSense, an open source
firewall operating system based off the FreeBSD distribution, a variant of the BSD
operating system. Due to the lineage and origin, pfSense is technically a variant of the
BSD operating system. One of the major contributing factors to selecting pfSense as the
operating system for the virtual machines was the open source nature of the project.
Open source software includes code that has been published publicly for consumers of
the project to copy, modify, and redistribute (Fitzgerald, 2011). Furthermore, according
to Fitzgerald (2011), since the software or operating system is open source, royalties and
fees no longer become a limiting factor as long as those using the code respect and quote
the primary contributions. These properties of open source software allowed for the
researcher to implement the proposed model programmatically. Furthermore, open
source software allows the study to be repeated by other entities more easily by
protecting them from the royalties, fees, and accessibility of closed-source software.
In addition to being open source, pfSense has a large community of users ranging
from single instances to larger enterprise consumers that have many installations.
Because of the high adoption rates and community support of the pfSense project, the
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pfSense distribution is a viable alternative to systems built and maintained by major
vendors such as Cisco, SonicWALL, WatchGuard, and others (Ribeiro & Pereira, 2009).
The wide-adoption, scalability, open source code, and expansive feature set of pfSense
made it an optimal choice for this study.
For the purpose of simplification in taking measurements while collecting data,
the topology only accounted for one BGP speaker in each autonomous system at a time.
This model did simplify the operation on of BGP on the Internet, but most security
protocols pertaining to BGP focus on inter-autonomous system communication (M. Zhao
et al., 2005). Furthermore, routing instability can be attributed to dropped packets,
network congestion, and abnormal network activities. To keep the assessment of the
model’s performance as focused as possible, these network anomalies were not accounted
for in the study. The study assumed that the network used by the model is in a reliable,
predictable, and functional state.
To serve the virtual machines or routers, a piece of software called a hypervisor
was required. Hypervisors are software instantiations that present hardware interfaces to
operating systems by serving resources and isolating virtual machines from each other
(Natanzon et al., 2013). Two main types of hypervisors; those that are native and those
that are hosted within an operating system. According to Natanzon et al. (2013), native
hypervisors are installed directly on top of hardware similar to an operating system
whereas hosted hypervisors run under a host operating system. Native hypervisors are
often referred to as “Type I” whereas hosted hypervisors are referred to as “Type II”
(Iqbal, Pattinson, & Kor, 2015). Due to concerns with efficiency of hypervisors and
eliminating external variables such as a host operating system, this study implemented
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native hypervisor. Examples of native hypervisors include VMware ESXi and Xen
(Desai, Oza, Sharma, & Patel, 2013).
A single hypervisor hosted the virtual environment that the model and simulation
results were performed in. In addition, the hypervisor was free of other virtual machines
so that only those being studied were running. The exclusion of other virtual machines
was again intended to reduce the possibility of unintended influences affecting
measurements from within the hypervisor. In addition, the hypervisor was isolated from
other networks and servers itself as to not impose any external influences on the system
hosting the virtual machines. By keeping the system isolated and as purpose-driven as
possible, the risk of impurities in the data were lessened.
Research Model and Design
The basis of the problem in the study was that a BGP message recipient does not
validate route updates before accepting them. To provide a vector for BGP speakers to
attest routing updates, the resulting artifact was built upon proven models and
methodologies that have been implemented to solve similar issues. These grounds
provided for a more easily adoptable solution and one that has been established in certain
capacities. This section will detail the research from two lenses: the introduction of a
condition into the environment and the treatment of said condition.
BGP sub-prefix hijacking attacks are a situation where unauthorized BGP
speaking peers claim specifically defined networks that they do not own. Essentially, the
advertisements of these unauthorized networks appear the same way that authorized route
advertisements do to receiving routers. When a router receives any route advertisement,
the process of convergence happens. Convergence includes everything that takes place
on a router from the time a BGP route is sent and when the receiving router stabilizes its
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routing table. This convergence process can result in a measurement of the time it takes
for a router to receive an update, process the update and either commit or reject the
update form the routing table.
This process of convergence was a primary measurement of the overall impact of
introducing a model to perform BGP route attestation in terms of performance and
overhead. As previously stated, convergence happens through the processing of both
valid and invalid routing updates. Therefore, in order to measure the resulting data,
convergence was forced on participating routers by the introduction of valid and invalid
routing updates from a trusted peer. These routing updates did not only simulate real
routing updates, but they also covered the sub-prefix hijacking scenario. Using route
introduction as the condition to cause convergence gave insight into the overhead of the
proposed model as well as the effectiveness in performing route attestation.
The second piece of the research design in addition to the condition is the
treatment. In the scope of this study, the treatment was the introduction of a model to
perform route attestation on received routes to allow legitimate route updates and
disallow other updates. This treatment or model is detailed in the subsequent design
characteristics and procedures.
One of the cornerstones of the proposed model was a trusted and secure Central
Authority (CA). Numerous examples show that due to the design of the BGP-4 protocol,
participating routers cannot simply trust each other as they have been. The plentiful route
hijacking attacks that have taken place (Butler et al., 2010) support this idea. The CA was
a standalone component that routers were able to query much like a traditional DNS
server. The CA served the following roles and asserted these properties.
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1. The CA provided ownership information of an autonomous system
through reverse and standard DNS queries. These attributing DNS records
were named in a scalable, standardized fashion as discussed in the
literature review such as ip6.arpa (Eidnes et al., 1998). This property
provided authorization for an autonomous system to advertise a prefix.
2. Resource records used in the DNS lookups mapped from the network
prefix and resolved to the owner/authorized advertising autonomous
system for that prefix. Also contained in a DNS record for the prefix was
a public key generated by the autonomous system owner.
3. Information contained within and disturbed in the DNS system was
assumed to also be accurate from the vantage point of the routers.
Validation was achieved through this property. Trust information was
established with PKI infrastructure.
4. PKI keys stored and distributed with DNS modeled the scheme seen in
DomainKeys (Delany, 2007). These provided a mechanism for
authentication.
The above assets of the central authority facilitated authorization, validation, and
authentication of a BGP speaker and the route update. This follows the standards for
route attestation prescribed by Delany (2007).
A second critical component in the artifact was the actual BGP speaking routers.
Communication between BGP routers and the CA happened over IPv6, which natively
establishes IPSec tunnels for secure delivery of information. To supplement the
communication with the central authority over IPv6, extension headers were used to carry
authentication information. Carrying data in the extension headers resolved the need for
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a large amount of extra network traffic in terms of packets sent. In addition, as the IPv6
extension headers are 64-bit aligned, the processing of such headers is more efficient than
the processing of IPv4 counter parts. Routers participating in the new model followed
this high-level process as a BGP update message is prepared for delivery and received:
1. A BGP speaking router used the private key (public key is available in the
public DNS records) to sign any BGP advertisements originating from the
autonomous system.
2. The resulting signature of signing the BGP advertisement was be placed
into one of the IPv6 extension headers and the update was transferred to
the recipient routers.
3. When a router received the BGP update message, it processed the headers
and extracted the signature.
4. With the signature in hand, the router performed a DNS lookup on the
advertised network and claimant autonomous system. From that
information, the public key was sent back by the trusted DNS system.
5. The public key was then be used to determine if the signature associated
with the BGP was generated with the associated private key, and based on
the results of that test, the validity of the update was determined.
For the routers to participate in this type of model, they needed to run a modified BGP
software engine as this design was not in the BGP-4 specification (Yakov Rekhter & Li,
1995). The model was able to identify sub-prefix hijacking attacks as the malicious actor
would not be able to generate the correct signature in the update assuming the keys are
secure and the DNS system is uncompromised as stated above.
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Sampling Frame
Sampling is a method of studying a subset of a whole population with the intent
of providing an estimate of the prevalence of an unknown outcome on the larger
population (Kumar, 2014). The process of sampling has both advantages and
disadvantages that affect the accuracy of results produced by a study. According to
Kumar (2014) sampling is beneficial in situations where a population may not be studied
in its entirety or financial and human resources do not allow the whole population to be
studied. If the researcher chooses a sample appropriately and the tolerance of error is
acceptable, the results produced will be reasonably accurate. On the other hand,
sampling a population at best can only provide an estimate of the outcome on a
population. Effectively, error is possible when sampling, but can be calculated for and
minimized through correct inquiry and population selection (Kumar, 2014).
Due to the infeasibility of implementing this model across routers on the Internet
in production environments, a representative sample was used. Certain barriers exist that
make studying the Internet routers as a whole impractical including cost, closed-source
software, and the immense scale of the Internet. Due to the unknown number of routers
in the public Internet as it is a highly volatile environment, non-random sampling was
used. Kumar (2014) suggested non-random sampling is acceptable in such environments
where the total population is unknown. Again, due to similar issues with the size of
environment and available routers to be studied, a purposive sampling approach was
used. Purposive sampling allowed for the researcher to choose the sub-population based
upon necessary requirements (Kumar, 2014) such as following BGP implementation as
specified in the original protocol design.
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In order for this study to satisfy the goals of a sampling frame and describe the
potential impacts of implanting such a model in a larger population on the Internet, the
routers needed to be representative of those actively being used. To achieve a
representative population of real routers on the Internet, routers running pfSense were
studied. The rationale behind choosing pfSense was the open source nature of the
operating system and its implementation of the OpenBGPD service for providing BGP
routing. OpenBGPD is an open source project that extends BGP functionality to
operating systems such as pfSense. Furthermore, OpenBGPD has been noted for its
compliance with standards documents indicating its correct operation of the protocol
(Bakker, Jasinska, Raszuk, & Hilliard, 2013). This helped bridge the gap between the
sample population and the Internet population of BGP speaking routers as the correct
operation of BGP should be present in both groups.
From a hardware standpoint, pfSense machines are present on the publicly facing
Internet and would consist of the same components as far as CPU, RAM, and network
interfaces as traditional routers. Those pfSense routers in the Internet population would
be represented by the non-random sample population in that sense. Numerous vendors of
physical and virtual routers beyond those running pfSense have slightly different
architectures and components such as application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) chips
in their devices (Ganegedara, Jiang, & Prasanna, 2014). Those components may affect
the results of this study as they are applied to such devices, but that is beyond the scope
of what is being measured and observed. In a pure hardware scope, the study focused on
the overhead in CPU and memory utilization, which can be applied more universally to
all routers.
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In essence, the software operations of BGP speaking routers was accounted for in
the sample population by choosing an accepted and correct implementation of the
protocol provided by OpenBGPD. The hardware measurements taken in the sample
population were designed to take into account components that routers universally share
regardless of vendor. These two contributing factors to the composition of the purposive
sample group help suggest what an implementation of the model outside of the sampling
frame may result in. When interpreting results, the researcher needs to know that a
limitation of sampling and more specifically non-random sampling is that the results are
an estimation of the impacts on a population as a whole (Kumar, 2014).
Data Collection
Virtual routers participating in the BGP environment were the primary source of
data to be collected throughout the study. The data collection took place using various
operating system tools within the virtual routers alongside of reporting systems that exist
within the host or hypervisor virtualization environment. Measurements were collected
to cover the areas of CPU performance, RAM utilization, bandwidth
utilization/consumption, and route convergence times on all participating routers. These
measurements showed how the model affected each router individually and gave insight
into the scalability of the model as more routers are added.
When investigating the impact on BGP security solutions the most important
metrics are BGP convergence time, message size, and memory costs rather than CPU
utilization (M. Zhao et al., 2005). Specifically, M. Zhao et al. (2005) argued that
convergence time better demonstrates the impacts of computational overhead pertaining
to security protocols as opposed to CPU utilization. Convergence time demonstrated the
amount of time it took for a route update to be sent, received, processed, and forwarded if
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necessary. According to Liu (2009), CPU consumption is a very important metric when
assessing software performance which is closely related to this study. Therefore, CPU
utilization was gathered in addition to the other metrics.
The virtualized routers ran the pfSense operating system, which is based off the
FreeBSD distribution. FreeBSD is the base upon which pfSense is built, therefore it is a
closely-related operating system that has gained a reputation for being free, highly stable,
powerful, and efficient (Chen & Zhu, 2014). Since pfSense is based off FreeBSD,
technically a version of the BSD operating system, it has many of the same tools and
utilities designed to measure CPU utilization, bandwidth consumption, RAM
consumption, and other metrics. These performance monitoring tools and utilities have
been used in various studies (Seo, Hwang, Moon, Kwon, & Kim, 2014; Zhao, 2002) and
provide accurate and valid measurements. The usage of built-in utilities that are widely
implemented is their general acceptance among the community of users as a quasistandard.
One of the pivotal tools that was used in the study to monitor performance and
consumption of relevant computing resources is called “vmstat”. This utility has the
ability to show quantitative system performance metrics in the following areas: processes,
memory, paging, disks, faults, and CPU (Lucas, 2008). Furthermore, vmstat is able to
display performance measurements in real-time or as snapshots in time. This gives
flexibility to how the information can be interpreted, either as instantaneous readings or
as a summarization of events over time. The metrics of CPU, memory, and bandwidth
consumption were used collectively to describe overall overhead. A researcher should
consider that the actual measurement of CPU, memory, and bandwidth consumption
could itself have a performance impact on the system. This potential performance impact
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was accounted for as vmstat has been used in other studies minding performance
(Weikuan, Yandong, & Xinyu, 2014; Xiao, Song, & Chen, 2013; Yu & Lan, 2016) and
was ran in all tests, theoretically introducing the same if any performance impacts.
Convergence time in BGP is the time span from when a speaker announces an
update until the entire network returns to a stable state (Meiyuan Zhao, Sean W Smith, &
David M Nicol, 2005). The originating peer of a BGP update message generated an entry
into a log file with the exact time that the message was advertised to peers. As each
neighboring router received the update and stabilized their routing tables, they too
generated timestamps of the event. The convergence time could then be calculated by
subtracting the time of the origination message from the last routing table stabilization
time. This calculation represented the convergence time of all routers participating in the
security model, which could then be compared to the same environment that did not
participate in the security model. To ensure consistency, the participating routers had
their clocks synchronized to a central system such as a Network Time Protocol (NTP)
server.
Bandwidth consumption can take shape of many different measurements such as
packets per second, size of packets or messages, time the line is in use, and others. Since
the model introduces a fixed number of additional packets when compared to traditional
BGP message processing, there was an increase of total packets transmitted. Therefore,
the measurement of additional packets in this study was excluded. As M. Zhao et al.
(2005) identified message size as an important metric of assessing BGP security proposal
performance, the study focused on that measurement. Message update size can be
measured by accounting for all packets received and transmitted during the transaction
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and totaling the number of bytes in those packets. This represents the total bandwidth
consumed for an update message.
When sampling performance or scalability issues in software designs, one of the
first and most important measurements to take is that of CPU utilization on each of the
systems being tested (Liu, 2009). Since computers are time-based, performance
monitoring happens at set intervals called samples. Specifically related to processor
performance, the samples can be measured with processor time. Every processor has an
idle thread, which effectively consumes CPU cycles while there is no work for the
processor to do. Essentially, this idle thread represents the utilization or lack thereof of
the CPU. According to Liu (2009), processor time can be calculated by monitoring the
time that an idle thread is active during a sample interval, and subtracting it from the
interval duration. This formula was taken into account when measuring the processor
performance and the data can be obtained from vmstat.
RAM may be simpler to measure as far as utilization is concerned than compared
to measuring the use of a processor. Since every computer system has a finite amount of
RAM available, the measurement of how much is available and how much is consumed
can provide an accurate representation of its utilization (Tanaka, 2005). When RAM is
over utilized, computer systems will offload some of the memory contents to disk which
is known as paging. If no paging is occurring while the measurement of memory
utilization is taken, the measurement will show an accurate representation according to
Tanaka (2005).
These metrics were queried from the operating system level within the virtual
machine and logged to a file that exists on the host. This allowed a baseline to be
gathered of the routers operating in a controlled environment. Once a baseline was
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established for the virtual routers, the attestation model could be introduced and the same
performance counters were used to gather the new set of data. If the data collection
process occurred in the exact same way, this should negate the introduced performance
hit of additional logging. Once all of the tests had been run, the results were compiled
into a computational program for analysis and validation. By pulling all of the results
into a single repository, the data could analyzed and evaluated centrally.
To provide a more-accurate overview of the results from the model simulations,
multiple iterations of the tests were done. In similar tests, M. Zhao et al. (2005)
suggested that 20 iterations of each test was sufficient to provide mean values of the
results using descriptive statistics. By running multiple iterations for each simulation,
those participating in the model and those not participating, would help account for any
external influences that may impact the testing despite isolation efforts, and assist with
providing validity and reliability of the data. The results in the report contain the mean
values gathered across the multiple iterations of each instance.
Instrumentation
The instrumentation of the research exercise details how pertinent information is
going to be gathered (Creswell, 2009). The instruments used to gather data for the study
were those discussed in the Data Collection section. These instruments were responsible
for gathering CPU utilization, bandwidth consumption, RAM consumption, and route
convergence times. The instruments used to collect this data were designed for
measuring those specific data sources by design and were not modified by this study.
As Creswell (2009) noted, if existing instruments are being used in an unmodified
form, the researcher must consider the established validity and reliability of such tools.
Certain areas surrounding the validity of the instrument need to be considered depending
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on the nature of what is to be collected. The three main areas of validity to look for in
chosen instruments include: content validity, predicative or concurrent validity, and
construct validity (Creswell, 2009). Effectively, these forms of validity cover ground that
an instrument measures what it is intended to measure, accurately predicts a criterion
measure, or measures hypothetical constructs and concepts.
For this study, content validity was of the most importance. Content validity is
significant as the tools available to measure metrics such as CPU consumption, RAM
utilization, and route convergence times are observational in nature. The nature of those
tools aligned well with the design of the study, which was a before-and-after comparison
of the model minding the researcher’s intervention. Predictive validity did not align as
well because the study was not designed to predict the impact of the model; rather it was
to measure the actual impact of the proposed mode. Furthermore, construct validity was
not suited as well as content validity as the study was not intended to measure a certain
explanatory variable that is not directly observable.
Validity and Reliability
Establishing the quality of research results can be described as the researcher’s
duty to establish the validity and reliability of research performed (Kumar, 2014). The
terms validity and reliability both are used in describing the quality of research results,
but they are not the same. Creswell (2009) noted that validity is not a companion of
reliability or even generalizability. Validity should answer the simple question as to
whether or not the researcher is measuring what he or she thinks they are measuring
(Kumar, 2005). Therefore, it is important for the researcher to understand how validity
should be described in the context of this research.
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When viewing validity, the same connotations do not exist in quantitative
research as they do in qualitative research. According to Creswell (2009), qualitative
validity is determined if the research checks the accuracy of findings by implementing a
set of certain procedures, whereas Venkatesh, Brown, and Bala (2013) state that
quantitative validity refers to the legitimacy of findings. Furthermore, in quantitative
research, two key issues that define validity are addressed, those issues being reliability
and validity of measures.
Due to the nature and design of this quasi-experimental study, quantitative
validity methods were more appropriate because the data collected is numeric,
measurable data. Kumar (2014) constructed the definition of content validity as the
instruments’ ability to measure what they are designed to measure. One method of
validating tools used to measure computational performance metrics is to collect the same
metrics with another tool (Fortier & Michel, 2003). Testing measurements with multiple
tools is popular when modeling is used to study the research problem. Fortier and Michel
(2003) suggested that when a real system is available instead of a conceptual model, real
system measurements are the most reliable means of validation as opposed to multiple
simulated measurements. This study employed the operation of virtual routers actively
participating in the proposed BGP route attestation model rather than the research being
carried out in a simulated fashion. As a result, real system measurement was used to
perform validation.
Reliability is another important part of evaluating a research instrument in
addition to validity. Reliability is defined as the repeatability or consistency of a research
instrument’s measurements (Creswell, 2009). In essence, reliability is the repeatability of
a measurement. An estimation of reliability describes a relationship between the
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consistency and stability of the instrument that shows the predictability and accuracy of
the measurements (Kumar, 2014). A higher degree of consistency and stability observed
in an instrument indicates a stronger presence of reliability of the instrument.
To obtain this estimation of reliability, two main lenses may be used: how reliable
an instrument is, and how unreliable an instrument is. If an instrument produces
consistent measurements in the same or even similar environments, the should be
considered reliable (Kumar, 2014). On the other hand, if collected measurements show a
degree of difference when the instrument is used in the same or similar environments, the
level of error can be used to describe how unreliable the instrument is. This forms an
indirect relationship, the higher degree of error in the measurements, the lower degree of
reliability of the instrument. Likewise, the lower degree of error or deviation in results
indicates a higher degree of reliability of the instrument.
Of the different ways in measuring the reliability of an instrument, Kumar (2014)
suggested observing two groups: internal and external consistency procedures. External
consistency employs two separate processes of data collection that are used to verify the
reliability of the measure. Within the external consistency group methods that exist are
the “test/re-test” method as well as running parallel forms of the same test. Both methods
provide the same insight into external consistency and circumstantially one method may
fit a study better than the other method.
The test/re-test method is a repeatability test where the researcher takes
measurements with an instrument, and the instrument is administered a second time
within the same or as close to the same conditions as possible (Kumar, 2014). The
resulting ratio is an indication of how reliable the instrument is; that is, the higher the
ratio the higher reliability. The test/re-test method is particularly advantageous because
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the method allows the researcher to test the instrument against itself, thus eliminating
some complications that can arise when determining reliability. In certain studies such as
a survey, the test/re-test method may be unfavorable as it can educate users in the test
phase, possibly skewing the results. Unintended consequences such as user education
during testing are not observed in technical studies where human subjects are not used.
A second method of performing external reliability testing is to run parallel forms
of the same test. Kumar (2014) described this approach as creating a second instrument
that is designed to measure the same results and administering both instruments at the
same time against different populations. Reliability is determined if both of the
instruments produce similar results at the end of administration. A parallelized approach
is disadvantageous because of the difficulty in creating two instruments that are designed
to measure the same phenomenon and deemed valid. Furthermore, the inconsistencies in
population groups may also hinder the usability of this method. This approach does
however remediate the problem of recall or user education as seen in the test/re-test
external reliability testing.
For this research, a test/re-test methodology was used to determine external
consistency. The rationale for choosing the test/re-test procedure takes into account both
the population being studied as well as the instrumentation used to measure quantitative
results related to computational overhead and route convergence times. Since the
population was not human or learning by nature, rather the population was composed of
virtual routers, the problem of recall did not exist. Secondly, the software used to
measure CPU performance, RAM utilization, bandwidth utilization/consumption, and
route convergence as previously described composed an instrument to measure overhead.
These pieces of software were consistent with other related research (Seo et al., 2014;
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Zhao, 2002). Those studies that utilized a similar toolset as outlined in the Data
Collection section ran the tests numerous times and presented mean scores of the
measurements, not in parallel execution. Running numerous tests and quantifying the
results most closely aligns with the test/re-test procedure.
In addition to external consistency, internal consistency needs to be considered as
well in certain circumstances. The goal of internal consistency is to ensure that any items
measuring the same phenomenon should produce similar results (Kumar, 2014). Internal
consistency is commonly observed when dealing with human subjects in a survey or test
related technique. The idea being that multiple questions measuring the same type of
data should produce similar results, thus indicating internal consistency. In this research,
the instruments used to collect data were specifically designed to take the measurements
related to overhead, and were not modified or adapted to suit a different purpose. In that
scenario, a test/re-test method serves to estimate the reliability of empirical measurements
most easily (Carmines & Zeller, 1979).
Data Analysis
Data analysis encompassed multiple areas to summarize the individual test results
into meaningful and manageable results. While many different variations of data analysis
exist and are applicable in different studies, there are central concepts to what data
analysis should provide. Two key categorizations of data analysis exist, those being
descriptive and inferential statistics (Babbie, 2013). Nonetheless, the intended result is
the same, to interpret and present the data into a succinct summarization.
Choosing the appropriate categorization of data analysis is important to accurately
make statements about general populations or to describe what is happening in a studied
situation. Inferential statistics are commonly used when a research studies a sample
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population and uses those observations to make larger generalizations (Rugg, 2007). On
the other hand, descriptive statistics are designed to describe what is happening in a
population or data set. Given the high-level nature of what inferential and descriptive
statistics are intended to represent, descriptive statistics more closely aligned with the
research goals in this study. The primary rationale for analyzing the data with descriptive
statistics was that the study focused on an entire, controlled population rather than
piecing out a sample of a larger population.
Descriptive statistics can be further broken down into two sub categories: central
tendency and degree of spread. Central tendency is one of the most common methods of
descriptive statistics as it aims to determine where the average set of values resides
(Salkind, 2010). These values from central tendency may include mean, median, and/or
mode. Salkind (2010) described the degree of spread as how data is disturbed with
measurements of range. To maintain consistency with other similar studies (M. Zhao et
al., 2005), mean values were used to describe performance and route convergence
overhead.
Certain challenges do exist in performing statistical analysis of network data
problems and computational performance monitoring. One of the primary challenges is
the enormity of data that can be collected (Heard & Adams, 2014). Another challenge
that relates particularly to network data is the correlation or timing of events.
To facilitate the analysis of this data, Kumar (2014) suggested that the data should
undergo three primary steps including: editing the data, reducing the data, and analyzing
the data. For this study, computational programs were used to better the fluency and
accuracy of these three tasks. These computational programs were primarily used in the
data analysis phase to perform complicated calculations used to derive descriptive
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statistics (Kumar, 2014). Cleaning and reducing the data was an important part of
making the collected data more manageable.
A primary set of goals for this process was to remove samples collected before
and after the researcher’s intervention, remove invalid results, and categorize the
measurements. Once that was done, measures of central tendency or measures of spread
were used to present trends or changes among the variables. Once the data was cleaned
and categorized, the actual analysis was performed in order to test the hypothesis of the
research and to draw conclusions. The results from the analysis will be detailed in
Chapter 4.
Summary
The purpose of this quasi-experimental quantitative study was to determine what
degree of overhead is introduced into BGP speaking routers when a model for route
attestation is implemented. Chapter 3 provides details and insights into the overall design
of the study, the technical objects being studied, and what methods will be leveraged.
Areas surrounding the instrumentation, validity, reliability, and data analysis were also
addressed in this chapter. Chapter 4 will detail the results of the study along with design
characteristics and analysis of findings.
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS
The purpose of this quasi-experimental before-and-after study was to measure the
extent of the relationship between routers participating in a BGP model to perform route
attestation with IPv6 headers and the resulting performance impacts. Performance
metrics were further defined as CPU utilization, RAM utilization, bandwidth
consumption, and route convergence time. Measurements were taken to describe
performance on virtual routers running the open source operating system, pfSense, in an
isolated environment as described in Chapter 3. To summarize the collection methods,
CPU utilization and RAM utilization were gathered using the vmstat utility. Bandwidth
consumption was collected by running packet captures on both the router originating
updates as well as a DNS server responsible for serving cryptographic keys used in
attestation. Lastly, route convergence time was obtained through code changes in the
OpenBGPD service on the routers. Chapter 4 describes the data that was collected as it
pertains to answering the research question.
Data Collection
As described in Chapter 3, routers running in the virtual environment were
subjected to a series of tests to obtain data describing the performance impacts of the
proposed attestation model. A single set of virtual routers and virtual networks were used
to gather the performance data in all tests. Using a single set of virtual routers and virtual
networks provided consistency between resources allocated and device configurations.
The OpenBGPD configuration used on each of the routers was unchanged throughout the
study, and can be found in Appendix A. Details about the BGP environment are
described by the OpenBGPD configurations including neighbor adjacencies and network
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prefixes owned. In addition, the DNS server contained a TXT record populated with a
public key that provided ownership for each network prefix. An example of the TXT
record used for a DNS zone configuration can be found in Appendix B. A depiction of
the network used in the study is represented below in Figure 1. Router AS1000 served as
the sender of BGP update messages while router AS2000 received the updates and
processed them. The Client workstation was used to remotely access the virtual routers
via secure shell (SSH) in order to retrieve statistics and initiate each trial.

Figure 1. Network diagram representing the virtual environment used in data gathering phase.

Statistical data on receiving host’s RAM and CPU performance utilization was
gathered using the vmstat utility. This data was appended to a log file residing on the
receiving host’s file system and analyzed in CSV format. The vmstat utility was set to
gather data on CPU and RAM consumption every 0.5 seconds throughout the duration of
the trail. The receiving host logged vmstat output immediately before the BGP updates
were sent and ceased logging the output immediately after the last BGP update was
processed. Data gathered from vmstat was in a raw output format from the utility and
was later sanitized and converted to CSV format in Microsoft Excel for analysis. A new
log file was created for each trial performed and the summarized output can be found in
Appendix C.
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To obtain quantitative results about bandwidth consumption in the BGP updates
received by a host, a packet capture utility, Wireshark, was used. Wireshark allowed for
a host to record packets entering or exiting a network interface without modifying them.
This technique is also known as a passive packet capture. The passive packet captures
were run from the router originating the BGP update as to not impart additional or
unaccounted for overhead on the host receiving the update. Even though the packet
captures were passive in nature, RAM and processor resources were needed to interpret
and store the data. By nature of the TCP protocol that is responsible for carrying BGP
messages across a network, the packets were the same on the sending and receiving
routers.
Initially, metrics were to be gathered for each trial consisting of 20 BGP updates
to align with the study by M. Zhao et al. (2005). However, due to the speed of processing
20 route updates and the relative ease of gathering more data points, the desired sample
size was increased to 1,001 updates per trail. Three trials were run without the attestation
model as well as with the attestation model. As a result, more data was collected during
the study, and provided a truer representation of the costs associated with the model.
Furthermore, the increase in data collected allowed the trials to be run for a longer period
and gave insight into the reliability of the data collection instruments.
In each trial, the sending router, AS1000, initiated 1,001 BGP updates, which
were delivered to the receiving router, AS2000. Three trials were run in the environment
before the attestation model was introduced, and three trials were run after the model was
implemented. In total, the trials resulted in 3,003 convergence data points to be
examined in each model. Having an equal number of data points between samples
guaranteed that each treatment condition contributed equally to the results of the study
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(Keppel & Wickens, 2004). Additionally, the BGP routing updates sent during the testing
phases contained identical message contents and were initiated via a shell script to further
promote consistency in timing and delivery. These convergence metrics were logged in
comma-separated value (CSV) format on the Client host and later analyzed using
Microsoft Excel. These summarized metrics can be found in Appendix D.
Results
Analysis of the data gathered through the trials describes the impact on
performance that the BGP route attestation model had on participating routers. Guided
by Kumar (2014), the collected data was organized, reduced, and analyzed to provide
descriptive statistical results. The following sections detail the results as they pertain to
BGP route attestation performance impacts: CPU Performance, RAM Utilization,
Bandwidth Consumption, and Route Convergence Time.
Descriptive Observations: CPU Performance
CPU performance metrics were gathered via the vmstat utility, which polled every
0.5 seconds during each of the trials. According to (Weaver et al., 2013) a measurement
of user and system CPU time, called process time, is an effective measurement to
evaluate the performance of a program. The output of vmstat represented the process
time in three different columns that showed user time, system time, and idle time as
percentages of the total processor capacity. As Weaver et al. (2013) indicated, the sum of
user time and system time forms process time. The process time served as the
measurement describing performance on the participating routers as depicted in
Appendix C.
A router running OpenBGPD while processing BGP update messages averaged
0.55% processor consumption. After the BGP update attestation model was introduced,
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the average processor consumption of the router attesting BGP update messages was
4.17%. Overall, an increase of 3.62% processor time was observed relative to the trials
where no route attestation was performed. This increase demonstrated the additional
performance overhead imparted on a router that obtained the sender’s public key through
DNS and used it to verify the cryptographic signature of the BGP update message.
Descriptive Observations: RAM Utilization
Another important measurement in determining the overhead resulting from using
IPv6 headers to carry BGP update attestation information was RAM utilization. Again,
vmstat was used to gather information on the size of the free memory list belonging to the
receiving router. The free list represents a linked-list of pages in memory that are readily
available for a virtual memory manager (VMM) to allocate (Bacon, Cheng, & Shukla,
2013). In the duration of this study, the free list size decreased throughout the time the
router was processing BGP updates for each trial. This indicated that the blocks of
memory used to process the update had not been returned to the free table as the process
BGP process was continually running.
By knowing the size of the free list before the trials of updates were sent, and the
size of the free list after the router was done processing all of the messages, a sum of
memory consumption could be calculated and averaged out for each update message.
The resulting value showed the amount of RAM utilization for the duration of the trial.
These memory consumption measurements were gathered as the receiving router was
processing BGP update messages. Averaged figures representing the delta in free
memory pages for each trial can be found in Appendix C.
On average, during the unsinged update trials, the free table decreased by 1.15MB
or approximately 1,150KB. Therefore, the average amount of memory accessed per BGP
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update was 1.15KB. As far as the signed update trials, the free table decreased by an
average of 24.97MB per trail or 24,970KB. As a result, an average of 24.95KB was
consumed by the receiving router to process and attest each signed BGP update message.
In total, an increase of 23.81KB of RAM overhead was introduced per BGP update by
the attestation model.
Descriptive Observations: Bandwidth Consumption
Bandwidth consumption as previously defined in this study is the number of bytes
transmitted and received by a host while processing a BGP update message. In
particular, bandwidth measurements were taken only in the lens of the host receiving the
update message. Other relevant packets beyond the BGP update messages included the
DNS queries sent to and from the DNS server used for route attestation.
Adhering to the definition of a quasi-experimental before-and-after study (Kumar,
2014), unmodified BGP update messages were gathered and served as a baseline for
bandwidth consumed in a route advertisement. These packets displayed what the
receiving host acknowledged in terms of bandwidth on an incoming BGP update.
Analysis of the packet captures showed that each update message was 155 bytes in total.
In the unmodified environment, no additional packets were needed to complete the
update transaction. The format of a standard IPv6 packet carrying a BGP update and the
attribution of the size of the packet can be seen in Figure 2. The depiction of the packet
shows the minimum costs in terms of bandwidth consumed for BGP updates sent in an
environment following the IP and BGP specifications. Understanding the minimum size
and structure of the BGP update packets helps establish a baseline to measure any
increases from the route attestation model. A bassline will also be used to demonstrate
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where an observed size increase can be attributed to, and how the packet structure is
modified by the model.
Ethernet Frame – Header (14B)
IPv6 Datagram
IPv6 Header (40B)
IP Data
TCP Header (32B)
TCP Data
BGP Update Message for /64 Prefix (69B)
Figure 2. Standard format of an IPv6 packet carrying a BGP message with size shown in bytes.

A condensed packet dissection obtained from the passive packet capture can be
found in Appendix E. The packet dissection shows that the environment was producing
valid and compliant BGP update packets as presented in Figure 2 above. Confirming the
generated BGP update packets were valid contributes to the validity and significance of
comparative measurements made in the route attestation model. Such measurements
were made to demonstrate the effects of using IPv6 extension headers to carry route
attestation information have on packet size and bandwidth consumption.
In the modified model, IPv6 extension headers were used to carry attestation
information by means of a cryptographic signature. In particular, the Authentication
Header was used to transport the signature. Analysis from the passive packet captures
obtained the model showed an increase in size of the update messages which is to be
expected. Much like a signature on a document where the signees’ name consists of
letters on paper, the BGP sender’s attestation signature consists of bytes in a packet
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header. Regardless of the format, a signature adds data to the medium carrying it; in this
case, the medium was the packet Authentication Header.
In the attestation model, a signed BGP update message consisted of 295 bytes.
When comparing the unsigned BGP updates at 155 bytes to the signed BGP updates at
295 bytes, a 140-byte increase in bandwidth consumption was observed. Because the
actual BGP update messages remained unchanged, the entirety of the increase in packet
size resulted from adding an Authentication Header containing the signature of the
message.
By the IPv6 specification for Authentication Headers, a minimum of 12 bytes are
consumed in specifying the format and contents of the header (Kent, 2005). The 12-byte
cost in adding an Authentication Header is therefore unavoidable. An additional 128
bytes existed in the Authentication Header that were composed the signature of the
update message. In total, the size of the Authentication header was 140 bytes. A
different length signature could be used in signing the packets, which would affect the
total packet size of the message directly. A larger key-pair may be used to generate the
message signature, but would also impart additional overhead on the receiving node in
terms of incoming bandwidth consumed. Larger key-pairs in RSA signing schemes such
as the one used in this study result in larger signatures.
With the programmatic changes to the BGP service, a packet carrying attestation
information had the format shown in Figure 3. The depiction of the modified packet
clearly shows how the model modified the structure by the addition of the Authentication
Header. All other portions of the packet retained the same size and structure of the
unmodified BGP update as previously shown in Figure 2. Comparison on the unmodified
and modified packets clearly shows where an increase of packet size occurred due to the
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Authentication Header. Furthermore, no other elements of the packet were modified by
the model, thus attributing the 140-byte increase that was observed directly to the
Authentication Header.
Ethernet Frame – Header (14B)
IPv6 Datagram
IPv6 Header (40B)
Authentication Header (140B)
IP Data
TCP Header (32B)
TCP Data
BGP Update Message for /64 Prefix (69B)
Figure 3. Format of a modified IPv6 packet carrying a BGP message and attestation data with size shown
in bytes.

Appendix F contains an abbreviated packet dissection obtained from the passive
packet capture detailing the modified packet. The dissection of the modified packet
shows the detailed addition of the Authentication Header as well as its attestation
contents. Further analysis of the packet dissection reveals that the only change between
the unmodified packet and the packet carrying attestation data was the addition of the
IPv6 Authentication Header. Therefore, by comparative analysis, the Authentication
Header was the source of bandwidth overhead in carrying the signature.
A more detailed view of the Authentication Header shows the fixed fields that
cannot be changed as well as the variable length field used to contain the 128-byte
message signature. The following five fields within the Authentication Header have a
static length and imparted a 12-byte cost: Next Header, Payload Length, Reserved, and
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Security Parameters Index. The remaining field, Integrity Check Value, is a variable
length field, and held the 128-byte update signature in this study as shown in Figure 4.
Next Header (1B)

Payload Length (1B)

Reserved (2B)

Security Parameters Index (4B)
Sequence Number (4B)
Integrity Check Value (variable, 128B in this study)
Figure 4. IPv6 Authentication Header format with size shown in bytes.

An additional source of increased bandwidth consumption in the attestation model
was introduced by the necessary DNS queries initiated by the receiving host. As outlined
in the model’s design, a router receiving a BGP needed to obtain the sender’s public key
to validate the authenticity and authorization of the update. For every BGP update packet
that the receiving router acknowledged, two DNS packets were created. These DNS
packets were composed of one query packet from the receiving router to the DNS server,
and one response from the DNS server to the querying router.
DNS query packets originated from the receiving node and asked the DNS server
to return the sender’s public key, which was held in a TXT record. The query packets
used to ask the DNS server for the key were each 154 bytes long. In response, the DNS
server’s reply that contained the public key consisted of a single DNS query response
packet of 383 bytes in length. Again, this response may vary based on the key size
chosen for the cryptographic signature. In this model, DNS overhead introduced in
obtaining the sender’s public key was 537 bytes in total. A summarized DNS
conversation gathered from the packet capture can be found in Appendix G.
In summary, the attestation efforts introduced by this model resulted in a 677-byte
increase in bandwidth consumed. In total, the transaction of a receiving and validating a
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BGP update message costed the receiving router 832 bytes as compared to 155 bytes in
an unsigned update. Within the 677 bytes of overhead, 154 of the bytes were transmitted
by receiving router as outgoing bandwidth, and the remaining 523 bytes of data were
received by the router as incoming bandwidth. An autonomous system operator may
view different costs in terms of ingress and egress bandwidth as the costs may affect the
adoptability of the model.
Descriptive Observations: Route Convergence Time
To gather convergence timing metrics, the researcher modified the OpenBGPD
source code to include timestamps for route received events as well as when routes were
placed into the routing table. The programmatic changes can be observed in Appendix H.
Other than the addition of timestamp routines, OpenBGPD remained otherwise
unmodified in the before portion of the study. In the after portion of the study where the
source code included attestation methods, the timing routines were unmodified from the
prior sequence. Therefore, the same modification existed in both before and after the
intervention, thus eliminating variances between the two tests.
Before the attestation model was introduced, data was gathered to describe the
processing time it took the BGP service to receive an update and commit it to the routing
information base. When OpenBGPD received an update to the Session Engine (SE), the
process responsible for handling BGP messages, it performed a check to determine what
type of message was received. After the message-type was determined, any updates were
sent over to the Route Decision Engine (RDE) for processing. The RDE then determined
update validity and placed the prefix from the update in the routing table or discarded it
accordingly. At this point, the processing of the update was finished and a measurement
was taken. Therefore, the collection of this data spanned from when the route was
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deemed and update by the SE until the point at which it was processed or discarded by
the RDE.
As aforementioned in the Data Collection section, trials of 1,001 updates were
studied. In total, 3,003 updates were processed in the unattested environment and 3,003
additional updates were processed with the attestation model in place. An average
convergence time was calculated to serve as a baseline in typical BGP operation, which
formed a baseline to perform relative comparison against. The average convergence
times are displayed in Appendix D.
Averages were calculated of all 3,003 updates that were gathered between the
three different trials for unsigned and signed updates. The average processing time for
OpenBGPD receiving an update on the SE and accepting it in RDE without attestation
routines was 0.000211 seconds. When attestation routines were added to perform the
public key lookup and cryptographic signature verification, the average increased to
0.018330 seconds. In relative comparison, the signed updates took 0.018119 seconds
longer to process on average.
The increase in convergence time includes the retrieval of the sender’s public key
through DNS as well as the cryptographic validation of received BGP messages. On an
average across the attested route updates, DNS query and response time took 0.000689
seconds. The data collected from all three trials as describing overhead imparted by the
DNS transactions can be found in Appendix I. The remaining increase in route
convergence time compared to the unattested model can be attributed to the processing of
the cryptographic message signature.
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Statistical Analysis
Many different methodologies exist to demonstrate the applicability of a study to
larger populations demonstrating statistical significance (Keppel & Wickens, 2004).
Choosing the most appropriate model for evaluating research requires the analysis and
understanding of factors contributing to the measured results (Creswell, 2009). Salkind
(2010) asserted that when collecting data in an experiment, the outcome is always
susceptible to a degree of unpredictability by chance. Due to the degree of unpredictably
by chance is therefore necessary to identify areas within a study that can be described in
terms of statistical significance.
Statistical significance is used in order to show that any difference observed in the
analyzing the results is an outcome of the researcher’s intervention, not chance given the
research hypothesis (Keppel & Wickens, 2004). Tests are used to prove or disprove the
research hypothesis and demonstrate statistical significance by the ability to reject the
null hypothesis. Keppel and Wickens (2004) described the null hypothesis as the exact
opposite of a research hypothesis. Guided by definition, the null hypothesis in this study
would be that the BGP route attestation model adds no additional cost in terms of
performance overhead.
Identifying a Method to Demonstrate Statistical Significance
The research proposal of this study did not specifically identify a method for
determining statistical significance. Not identifying a method for determining
significance in the proposal promoted the opportunity for the researcher to select
appropriate tests based on the sample size and types of data collected. Factors including
the number and variety of data points were taken into consideration as well as the focus
of answering the research question contributed to the choice of method.
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Choosing the correct test to demonstrate statistical significance takes into account
several factors about a study including variances in a population, number of data points
collected, and the research hypothesis (Terrell, 2012). In addition, the number of
independent and dependent variables were taken into account as well as the quantitative
nature of the study. The independent variable in this analysis was observed to have two
levels: environment using the attestation model, and environment not using the attestation
model. Alongside of the independent variable, measurements were taken to describe the
dependent variable, route convergence times. In a scenario where there is one
independent variable with two levels and one independent variable, Terrell (2012)
recommended the use of a t-test to evaluate statistical significance.
Statistical Significance
Multiple tests are designed to demonstrate statistical significance (Keppel &
Wickens, 2004; Salkind, 2010; Terrell, 2012). T-test and F-tests are among the statistical
significance tests for evaluating contrasts recommended by Keppel and Wickens (2004).
F-tests may be used to indicate variance between populations, which then contribute to
the calculation of the t-tests. Keppel and Wickens (2004) noted that t-tests are effective
in providing conclusions where groups may contain unequal sample sizes or variances.
F-tests were first calculated to determine the population variances and indicated that the
samples did not share the same variance. For this study, t-tests were used to evaluate
statistical significance because of the difference in variance of the measured route
convergence times.
Proper statistical procedures were followed throughout the t-test calculations
(Keppel & Wickens, 2004; Terrell, 2012). Data was analyzed and calculations were
performed using Microsoft Excel. To calculate the variance and t-test statistics, the
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collected data on route convergence times were split into two groups: routers not using
the attestation model, and routers participating in the attestation model. After separating
the collected data into two groups, calculations were performed to determine each sets’
mean and sum squared deviates. The mean and sum squared deviates were used in
determining the populations variance, standard deviation, and t-value.
Sample Variance
Sample variance provides insight into the spread and variability of data values
(Ross, 2004).The first major calculation in determining the type of t-test to be used was
to find the variance of the sample. Acceptable degrees of freedom in a t-test are in part
dictated by knowing the sample variances, specifically if the variances are equal or not
(Terrell, 2012). A method of computing variance in samples is defined by Ross (2004) as
an average of the squared differences of each measurement from the mean of the sample.
Another common methodology of calculating variance in applied research is through the
computation of an f-test (Keppel & Wickens, 2004). Due to the applied nature of this
study, the f-test was chosen to calculate sample variances.
Variance was calculated by performing an f-test two-sample test. The f-test
computations were run using Microsoft Excel as suggested by Salkind (2010) to obtain
sample variances. For the signed update set of data, the calculated variance was
0.00032874. As far as the unsigned update set of data, the calculated variance was much
smaller at 5.2916x10-9. The resulting F value was then calculated as a ratio of variances
in the unsigned update data set and the signed update data set. F for this study was
calculated as 62124.60722. The information gained from the f-test dictated the type of ttest to be used to evaluate the statistical significance of the data which assumed unequal
variances (Terrell, 2012).
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Calculation and Evaluation of Statistical Significance
Next, a t-test statistic was calculated to estimate the population mean and evaluate
the null hypothesis. The t-test statistic was calculated by assuming unequal variances in
two samples as guided by the results of the f-test. This study focused on comparing
results of new model to an established one, which aligns with applied research. A onetailed, directional approach was used as Keppel and Wickens (2004) suggested that it is
best suited for applied research. Additionally, Terrell (2012) stated that a one-tailed
directional test is most appropriate in research where a directional hypothesis is to be
evaluated as it is in this study.
One of the first steps to computing a t-test result is to determine the alpha level,
also referred to as the significance level (Terrell, 2012). An alpha level of 0.05 was
chosen giving a 95 percent confidence interval, which is most common among
researchers (Keppel & Wickens, 2004; Terrell, 2012). The t-test was performed with
3,002 degrees of freedom and was used to determine a level of significance (p-value)
between the unsigned and signed samples. Given the desired confidence interval and the
degrees of freedom of the test, the critical one-tail value needed to demonstrate statistical
significance was calculated as 1.64536 (Terrell, 2012). Additionally, the p-value was
calculated as less than 0.00001, significantly less than the alpha level of 0.05. Analysis
of the data revealed a t-value of 54.76270, which is well above the required critical value
of the t distribution. Therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected and the difference between
sample means statistically shows the increase in route convergence time when using the
proposed model.
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Other Measurements
The other measurements gathered in the study are examined under a slightly
different lens than the route convergence times. CPU performance and RAM utilization
measurements resulted in less descriptive data points as they represent the mean over all
3,003 updates in each sample. Nonetheless, the same t-test procedure was calculated
against each of the metrics across the trials. CPU consumption averages were higher in
the attestation model as compared to those measurements gathered in the model where no
attestation was performed. Computation of the t-value for CPU performance showed
statistical significance with calculation of 8.18693 and a p-value of 0.00730. Average
RAM utilization was higher in the model where route attestation was being performed
across all three trials and resulted in a t-value of 31.53878 and a p-value of 0.00050.
Bandwidth consumption was not analyzed for statistical significance as the costs
associated with the attestation model were fixed. As OpenBGPD was assumed to be
implementing BGP correctly (Bakker et al., 2013), the modifications to the packet
contents and structure would be the same across a larger population that also correctly
implements BGP. Key sizes and all other data structures remain the same in the model
design, and therefore would impart the same bandwidth consumption increases as defined
in the descriptive observations. Other routers adopting the model should have the same
observations in terms of bandwidth consumption assuming that they elected the same
implementation of the mode.
Summary
The quantitative results of the research study were presented in Chapter 4. As
dictated by the before-and-after design, a series of tests were performed on a set of

96
routers running BGP with no route attestation model implemented. After the initial set of
data was collected on the environment, the researcher introduced the route attestation
model and performed the same tests on the environment. Together, the series of tests
formed a comparative foundation on which to draw descriptive statistics.
Microsoft Excel was used to analyze the results from both scenarios that were
obtained from log files and terminal output within the environment. The analysis on the
data was performed through two lenses: descriptive analysis and analysis for statistical
significance. The descriptive analysis of the quasi-experimental before-and-after study
showed that the introduction of a model where IPv6 headers are used to carry BGP
attestation information caused performance overhead. The additional performance
overhead was observed in all areas measured during the study including CPU
performance, RAM utilization, bandwidth consumption, and route convergence time.
Attribution of the performance overhead was discussed and is further detailed in Chapter
5. Additionally, a t-test statistical model was used to evaluate the statistical significance
of measurements as they pertained to CPU performance, RAM utilization, and route
convergence times. The increases in performance overhead observed in all three
categories was found to be statistically significant. Finding statistical significance
furthered the case that the observations were in fact a result of the researcher’s
intervention on the environment, the intervention being an introduction of the attestation
model.
Chapter 5 will detail the study’s limitations as they pertain to research design,
impact of external variables, specific security risks mitigated, and considerations
surrounding the cryptographic model used. Furthermore, findings interpretations about
the CPU performance, RAM utilization, bandwidth consumption, and route convergence
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times will be presented. Lastly, the researcher’s recommendations and identified
opportunities for future research related to the study are detailed in the subsequent
sections.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Attacks on BGP, specifically sub-prefix hijacking, have the potential to cause
widespread outages and impact resources across the Internet (Bornhauser & Martini,
2011; Yun & Song, 2015). Furthermore, since BGP is the public routing protocol used to
facilitate communication between Autonomous Systems, the possible consequences of
attacks on BGP are vast (Cardona et al., 2016). Therefore, providing security
mechanisms to protect BGP against such attacks is critical in the continued accessibility
of Internet resources (Bullock et al., 2015; FCC, 2012; Mahajan et al., 2002).
Several different BGP security mechanisms have been introduced and designed to
mitigate the risks of successful attacks being carried out (Bruhadeshwar et al., 2011; Hu
et al., 2004; J. Israr et al., 2010; Kent et al., 2000; Malhotra & Goldberg, 2014; White,
2003; Ying et al., 2009). However, none of the aforementioned solutions have addressed
the associated security issues still present in the IPv6 implementation of BGP (Butler et
al., 2010). Additionally, previously proposed solutions suffered from poor adoption rates
due to the perceived overhead and cost associated with them (P. Gill et al., 2011).
The specific problem addressed by this research is that extremely limited research
has been done on using IPv6 in an effort to protect BGP against attacks such as subprefix hijacking. This study proposed a model to address the sub-prefix hijacking
shortcoming of BGP through an examination of literature on attacks against BGP,
cryptographic solutions, IPv6 packet structure, IPv6 security mechanisms, and proposed
BGP security solutions. The proposed model used IPv6 extension headers to carry BGP
update attestation information generated by a cryptographic solution, and studied the
resulting performance-related impacts.
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Limitations
The choice of research design and methodology may have imposed certain
limitations regarding the results of the study. As Kumar (2014) indicated, a before-and
after design does not allow one to draw conclusive evidence that change can be credited
to the researcher’s intervention. In part, conclusive results cannot be obtained due to the
non-random sampling and selection of the population. As seen with true experiments,
random sampling eliminates certain differences in the characteristics of the devices being
studied (Creswell, 2009). Since this study was done under a quasi-experimental design,
the careful duplication and resource allocation of virtual routers minimized possible
differences in the population to diminish the impact of non-random sampling. Other
disadvantages exist within before-and-after studies as they result in a measurement of
total change. This means that the baseline measurements are compared to those taken
after researcher intervention. As a consequence, extraneous and independent variables
cannot be quantified as to their direct contribution of change (Kumar, 2014).
While effort and planning was put forth to eliminate outside variables affecting
the results of the study, it is not possible to entirely account for all possible variables. A
segmented virtual environment was used to host the set of routers, DNS server, and client
machine that were used for each test performed. This environment provided for a
consistently configured set of routers and devices while maintaining the exact underlying
hardware and resource allocation. Type I hypervisors as used in this study have a
complex nature in terms of potentially unaccounted for influences on the results, as do
the routers that were studied. In both the hypervisor and the router, there are many
necessary supporting processes that perform tasks both known and unannounced to
reporting software. Therefore, throughout the study, it is conceivable that variables
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unaccounted for may have affected the overall results. Additionally, the point of variance
due the enormity of data in a computer network study and correlation of timing is
underlined by Heard and Adams (2014).
This study aimed to provide a system to attest BGP routes in order to protect a
recipient from sub-prefix hijacking attacks. Other attacks against BGP such as Denial of
Service (DoS), neighbor spoofing, subversion, or redirection attacks may still affect
routers operating BGP (Ola & Constantinos, 2004; Qi, Xinwen, Xin, & Purui, 2015). No
attacks or threats to BGP other than sub-prefix hijacking were intended to be mitigated by
the proposed attestation model. Other undesirable impacts to BGP caused by
misconfigurations and accidental route advertisements may be avoided using the
attestation model. Such cases of misconfigurations may occur where an autonomous
system operator accidentally advertises a route belonging to another autonomous system.
While the mitigation of such misconfigurations could be an effect, it is unintended.
Part of the attestation model was based on a similar concept as seen in Domain
Keys (Hansen & Hallam-Baker, 2009). As in Domain Keys, the model required a sender
of a message to publish their public keys into a DNS record. The idea being that the
sender of a message signed their message with a private key, and the recipient decoded
the message using the public key obtained from the sender’s DNS record. This key-pair
was used to create and decode a signature providing attribution and authenticity of an
update message. Similar problems to those observed in DKIM existed in the attestation
model. For example, if an attacker were able to capture a valid update message in transit
to the intended recipient, the attacker would also have captured the signature of the
message. A captured signature could allow the attacker to perform a replay attack, thus
relaying false information appearing to originate from the valid sender (Kahate, 2013).
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Furthermore, storing the cryptographic keys within a DNS record imposed certain
limits on the size of the key which may affect overall cryptographic strength.
Technically speaking, a DNS TXT record can be a maximum of 65,535 bytes, but are
more practically implemented at just a few hundred bytes (Cheshire & Krochmal, 2013).
According to Cheshire and Krochmal (2013), constituent strings within DNS TXT
records are limited to 255 bytes. The 255-byte limit forced a restriction on the length of
public key able to be stored in one record, and therefore affects the potential effectiveness
of a cryptographic signature. A shorter cryptographic signature may be more susceptible
to the deciphering or derivation of a sender’s public key, compromising the attestation
information.
Lastly, the skills of the researcher may have affected the validity of the study.
The researcher’s limited experience and research expertise attribute to the possibility of
impact in soundness. During the study, an assumption was made that the researcher did
indeed possess the needed skills and mentorship to conduct and report on a study of this
design and nature.
Findings and Interpretations
Literature shows that BGP is susceptible to cyber-attacks that can result in
compromise to availability and integrity of services across the Internet (Bornhauser &
Martini, 2011; Sun et al., 2015; Yun & Song, 2015) . While solutions have been
proposed to secure BGP in IPv4 space, little has been done to assess and enhance the
protocol’s security in IPv6 (Butler et al., 2010). Furthermore, adoption rates of BGP
security solutions are affected by negative impacts to performance and route convergence
times as identified by network administrators (Lychev et al., 2013). These given facts led
the focus of this quasi-experimental before-and after study to investigate the possibility of
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using IPv6 extension headers to carry route attestation information. An attestation model
was built to evaluate the quantitative costs of performing BGP route attestation with the
IPv6 extension headers. The following discussion delivers a summary of the numeric
findings and interpretations that were discussed previously in Chapter 4 as they describe
the following metrics: CPU performance, RAM utilization, bandwidth consumption, and
route convergence times.
CPU Performance
Metrics on CPU performance were gathered over the course of three trials totaling
3,003 BGP updates for unattested routes as well as 3,003 BGP updates for attested routes.
When compared to an environment where no route attestation was being performed on
BGP updates, the attestation model required a higher percentage of CPU time
consumption. On average, processing the signed update messages increased processor
time consumed by 3.62%. The bar graph in Figure 5 shows the comparison of average
CPU percentage consumed during each trial in the signed and unsigned BGP update
models. A clear increase in CPU consumption was observed in the signed update model,
with the highest average increase being 5.01%. Again, while there is a notable increase
when compared to the unsigned model, the overall increase is a relatively small portion
of the router’s overall processing resources.
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Figure 5. Average CPU consumption % for the trials in both attested and unattested models.

Statistical significance was primarily evaluated using a t-test statistical method,
which showed a strong indication of statistical significance in the measurements. The
observed increase in CPU processing time was likely due to the cryptographic routines
required to validate the sender’s message signature. Software-based cryptography has
been shown to be resource intensive and often times a cause of overhead in security
models (Mathew et al., 2015).
RAM utilization
RAM utilization was measured simultaneously with CPU performance
measurements, using vmstat. On average, in an unattested model, an attested BPG route
update took 24.97KB extra memory when compared to updates carrying no attestation
information. The bar graph displayed in Figure 6 shows the average amount of RAM it
took for the router receiving the BGP update message to process it. While the increase in
RAM utilization looks large on the chart, the data sizes are relatively small compared to
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the router’s overall memory capacity of 1GB in this study. The overall memory
consumption of the router was increased by 0.002497% when performing route
attestation.
30
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Figure 6. Average RAM utilization per update processed for each trial in the attested and unattested
models.

Statistical significance t-test showed this result to be statistically significant in the
analysis phase of interpreting the results. RAM consumption may also be attributed to
the cryptographic routines as Mathew et al. (2015) indicated. Additionally, RAM was
used to store the sender’s attestation signature obtained from the IPv6 authentication
header. Both the storage of the signature and cryptographic processing contributed fixed
and variable costs in RAM utilization respectively.
Bandwidth Consumption
Bandwidth consumption metrics were gathered for each signed and unsigned
update sent across the network throughout the duration of the trials using the Wireshark
utility. Due to the way specifications designate the IPv6 Authentication Header format
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(Carpenter & Jiang, 2013), BGP message size, DNS query, and DNS response sizes, a
fixed cost in terms of bandwidth consumption was exposed. The added bandwidth
consumption when compared to an environment where no attestation was taking place
stemmed from two areas: retrieval of the sender’s public key and the BGP update
message signature. Over the course of each DNS transaction used to acquire the sender’s
public key, 537 extra bytes were exchanged between the querying router and the trusted
DNS server. The IPv6 authentication header introduced 12 bytes of header formatting
and an additional 128 bytes of cryptographic signature, or 140 total bytes of overhead. In
whole, 677 bytes of bandwidth overhead were introduced by the model per update.
Figure 7 shown below depicts the sources of the aforementioned costs in terms of
the increases in bandwidth consumption. These costs did not exist in the unattested BGP
routing environment, and are therefore a representation of the overall bandwidth
overhead introduced by the attestation model. The data can be separated out into two
categories for further explanation: DNS retrieval of the sender’s public key, and
attestation signatures carried in IPv6 Authentication Headers.
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Figure 7. Pie chart representing the attribution of bandwidth consumption overhead.

The largest source of bandwidth consumption overhead introduced by the model
was from the DNS query and response packets. The query packet was used by the sender
to ask the trusted DNS server for the sender’s public key. The response packet was sent
from the trusted DNS server back to the querying router and contained the sender’s
public key. Only certain information contained within the DNS packets was essential to
the attestation process. In the query packet, the attesting router identified the network to
be attested. In response, the DNS server’s reply contained the sender’s public key.
These two pieces of information introduced unavoidable overhead given the chosen
cryptographic methods. The rest of the data transmitted through the query and response
can be classified as overhead introduced by DNS.
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Figure 8. Pie chart showing critical attestation information for public key retrieval and DNS transaction
overhead.

Figure 8 graphically represents the breakdown of bandwidth consumption
overhead imparted by the DNS transactions used to obtain the route originators public
key. The largest portion of overhead came from the transfer of the actual public key
associated with the sender. This 216-byte cost would be unavoidable in scenarios that
used the same RSA public key size to represent the owner of a network prefix. In the
original query, a 63-byte cost was also unavoidable, as the recipient of the update had to
identify the network that it was requesting the key for. Therefore, a total of 258 bytes of
bandwidth overhead were introduced by the DNS protocol itself. Despite the overhead
related to the protocol itself, DNS was chosen as it is widely accepted and understood in
the public Internet space by autonomous system operators. However, in an effort to
minimize the impact of the model, a different protocol that shares the adoptability aspects
of DNS may be considered for the retrieval of a sender’s public key.
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Following the increases caused by DNS, the second largest contributor of
bandwidth consumption in the attestation model was the inclusion of a message signature
on each BGP update. The attestation model required the sender of a BGP update
message to cryptographically sign the message and place the contents into an IPv6
Authentication Header. A result of using the Authentication header was less transmitted
packets between the sender and receiver of a BGP update and therefore, less bandwidth
consumed.
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Update Message Signature (B)
Mandatory Authentication Header
Fields (B)

128

Figure 9. Pie chart displaying IPv6 Authentication header size and BGP update message signature size.

Figure 9 depicts the size relationship between the IPv6 Authentication Header’s
mandatory fields and the size of the BGP update message signature. The minimized
impact on bandwidth overhead is clearly visible as only 12 unnecessary bytes of data are
transmitted in addition to the required 128 bytes of the message signature. At a
minimum, if an additional IPv6 packet was sent to carry the message signature, 40-bytes
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would be introduced for the traditional IPv6 packet header. Extension headers remove
the need for additional packets and in examples such as this, have a lower cost. No
matter the carrier, the message signature will be a fixed size in all models using the same
type of RSA public and private key pairs. Overall, a very marginal amount of bandwidth
consumption overhead was introduced in relation to using the Authentication Header.
Unlike the other measurements in this study, bandwidth consumption was not
analyzed for statistical significance. The bandwidth overhead introduced by the model
would have the same impacts to other routers that properly implement IPv6
authentication headers, the BGP protocol, and chose the same cryptographic key sizes.
Due to the universality of these measurements, statistical analysis for significance was
omitted.
Route Convergence Times
The last significant measure of this study described route convergence times, or
the time it took a router to receive, process, and commit a BGP update to the routing
table. On average, attested route updates took 0.018119 second longer for the router to
converge on when compared to unattested route updates. As with CPU processing time
and RAM utilization, these measurements were shown to be statistically significant using
t-tests. Many contributing factors composed this increase in route convergence time, as it
is essentially a measurement of the attestation model’s delay. DNS transactions caused
an average of 0.000689 seconds delay in that the querying router had to generate a
request and wait for the trusted DNS server to respond. Furthermore, the cryptographic
routines also accounted for the increase in route convergence time. The relationship
between the DNS transactions and the cryptographic routines are depicted in Figure 10.
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Figure 10. Relationship between overhead in convergence time caused by DNS transactions and
cryptographic functions.

Recommendations
This study pursued the relationship between implementing a BGP route attestation
model using IPv6 extension headers and the resulting impacts to router performance. A
review of literature showed a clear need to improve the overall security of BGP against
various attacks, including sub-prefix hijacking. Several studies showed that such
protections were possible in the IPv4 implementations but exploration into IPv6 solutions
was extremely limited. Furthermore, the previously proposed solutions were associated
with high performance costs to the operation of the routers, which directly affected their
adoptability. Idealistically, the overall benefits of enhanced security and protection of
network resources would be the top priority of network operators, but such is not the
case. Usability and end user experience are often prioritized over security.
Guided by the preparation, literature review, design of the model, implementation
of the model, and analysis of the results, recommendations can be made. These
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recommendations encompass viewpoints and insight gained from the performance of the
study. This section addresses recommendations in the following areas: using IPv6
extension headers for route attestation, reducing performance costs in the attestation
model, motivation to adopt secure routing models, and the need for additional research on
the subject.
Using IPv6 Extension Headers for Route Attestation
A proof-of-concept BGP route attestation model was created and implemented in
this study. The attestation model showed that IPv6 extension headers could be
successfully used to carry signatures of a BGP message to prove authenticity and
authorization. The study demonstrated that IPv6 extension headers could be used to carry
signature information efficiently due to the performance driven qualities that surround
them while imparting a limited amount of bandwidth overhead. In addition to the
enhanced performance of IPv6 headers compared to IPv4 headers, other extension
headers exist to promote encrypted communication between endpoints.
In the study, the Authentication Header was used to carry the cryptographic
signature of the BGP update message. As seen in Chapter 4, the overhead imparted by
the header itself was only 12 bytes. When compared to other means of exchanging keys
with additional packets, the cost comparison favorably aligns with the use of extension
headers. Other internal routing protocols are already using Authentication Headers to
provide integrity, authentication, and confidentially of routing exchanges such as
OSPFv3 (Coltun, Ferguson, Moy, & Lindem, 2008). These types of extension headers
are proven effective in internal routing and they should be tapped into for securing
external routing protocols such as BGP in a similar fashion.
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Overall, efficiencies and security gained from using extension headers further
necessitates the need for more entities to adopt IPv6 in place of IPv4. The movement of
autonomous systems to the IPv6 space will enhance the adoptability of such models. As
IPv6 matures, the headers and processing times are likely to follow, and use will be
widened across autonomous systems.
Reducing Performance Costs in the Attestation Model
Performance costs were introduced by the attestation model; a common
observation when implementing security enhancements in applications. Cryptographic
operations impart overhead on an environment, and their costs need to be evaluated
accordingly. In the proposed attestation model, costs in terms of bandwidth consumed
per route update under 677 extra bytes and only two additional packets were transmitted.
Similarly, route convergence times also increased from the unattested model, but still
measured in a just over one-hundredth of a second to process. Likewise, RAM and CPU
consumption showed 23.81KB and of 3.62% increases respectively.
These costs were all depicted as deltas from a model where no BGP route
attestation was in place. While the costs were in cases substantially higher in percentage
increases, their real numeric increases describe the impact more truthfully. True costs
should be evaluated by potential adopters of any security model including the one
proposed in this research when determining the adoptability and impact on an
environment.
Reducing costs in the proposed attestation model of this study can be done in
many areas. The two most impactful areas to reduce overhead would be the retrieval of a
sender’s public key as well as the cryptographic processing of the signed message. Using
DNS to store a sender’s public key has been done in other accepted models such as
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domain keys for email integrity (Crocker et al., 2011). While it does help verify an
owner of a domain or a net block in this case, several limitations exist that make DNS a
less attractive option when considering the future.
The biggest drawback to using DNS as a host for the public key is the limitation
of key size to 255 bytes (Cheshire & Krochmal, 2013). As the ability for systems to
solve cryptographic problems increases, the response has been to use longer key pairs or
algorithms that are more complex. When limited to 255 bytes held within a single TXT
record, the potential length of key pairs is severely limited. Therefore, the longevity of
such solutions is minimal and alternatives to key storage should be explored.
Additionally, the transactions for DNS proved costly to transmit the 216 bytes
representing the sender’s public key. When considering the DNS transaction to retrieve
the sender’s public key, approximately 48% of the transaction did not carry data directly
related to attestation. The additional data was comprised of packet headers and fields
specifically related to the DNS protocol. Therefore, DNS is an effective, but costly
method of querying and retrieving public keys. Furthermore, when considering the
limitations of the key size, the opportunity to evaluate different key delivery mechanisms
is apparent.
Outside of the DNS realm, a large contributor to the increase in route convergence
times was attributed to the cryptographic routines. These routines were responsible for
parsing the IPv6 packet to retrieve the message signature, and resigning the message with
the sender’s public key. If the transmitted signature matched the newly calculated
signature, the message was deemed valid. Certain challenges existed with this model as
the cryptographic implementations were done entirely in software. Routers should be
using hardware-based cryptographic processors or application specific integrated circuits
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(ASICs) to lessen the resulting overhead. Keshavamurthy, Upadhyaya, and Gopal (2011)
exemplify how such hardware accelerators can be used to improve cryptographic
calculation times. This study and other similar attestation models would benefit from
such enhancements.
Motivation to Adopt Secure Routing Models
Autonomous system operators are strongly encouraged to investigate and weigh
the cost of adopting a secure routing model against the risk of potential routing attacks.
There is no governing body on the Internet enforcing networks move to secure routing,
adopt IPv6, or make changes to advance the state of the Internet. Therefore, the
realization of the need to adopt secure routing falls on researchers and network
administrators alike.
In certain scenarios, the benefit of adopting a secure routing model is obvious.
For example, when YouTube was affected by a sub-prefix hijacking attack in 2008, the
adverse effects lasted for approximately two hours twenty minutes. (Bornhauser &
Martini, 2011). Consider the average increase in time for route convergence by this
model of 0.018119 seconds per update. For the cost of the model to outweigh the time
YouTube was affected by the adverse BGP route, YouTube would have needed to see
approximately 463,602 BGP updates. That is not an unforeseeable amount of BGP
updates for a large organization, but this would be the number for a single routing
incident. Additionally, the initial problem may have been avoided altogether by the use
of such a model.
When these types of measurements and metrics are evaluated, additional
performance costs are better put into perspective. The potential positive impact of such
models can outweigh the cost associated with running environments in insecure routing
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models. All routing protocols, not just BGP, should be continually evaluated and built
upon to offer enhanced security to protect the integrity and authorization of routes, but
equally as important, adoptability needs to be considered.
Need for Future Research
In addition to the statistically significant outcomes, this study shows a clear
necessity for further research. Literature illustrates that BGP speaking networks are
continually affected by sub-prefix hijacking attacks from malicious and unintentional
actors (Ballani et al., 2007; Biersack et al., 2012; Bornhauser & Martini, 2011; Wählisch
et al., 2012). Costs associated with the adverse effects of sub-prefix hijacking can
substantial in terms of downtime, disruption to service, and economic side effects. As
IPv4 address depletion continues and IPv6 address adoption grows, further research
should to be done in securing protocols the Internet depends on. To further the research,
this study be explored further to reduce performance costs and address adoptability
issues. Similar models have been developed and studied; different combinations of ideas
or the introduction of new suggestions will progress the field in a positive direction.
Recommendation for Future Research
The problem identified throughout the literature review upheld the idea that BGP,
the Internet’s routing protocol, is impacted by many shortcomings in security. One of
those shortcomings allows an attacker to hijack traffic intended for a destination by
advertising a more specific or longer prefix. This type of attack is known as sub-prefix
hijacking. An examination of the literature revealed that proposed solutions to the
shortcomings in BGP resulted in high costs in terms of overhead, and left the IPv6
protocol unevaluated. This study analyzed one method of leveraging the performance
benefits and extendibility of IPv6 headers to protect BGP against sub-prefix hijacking
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attacks. Although this study provided insight into the cost of the model in terms of CPU
performance, RAM utilization, bandwidth consumption, and route convergence times,
other areas of interest remain for future study. This section is intended to provide
recommendations and insight into related areas of interest for future research.
The two largest sources of overhead in this study resulted from the retrieval of
the public key via DNS and the cryptographic signature validation. Minimizing those
impacts could further benefit the model by reducing overhead and increasing the
adoptability. Similar challenges existed in the Domain Keys Identified Mail (DKIM)
solution that this model was in part based upon (Keshavamurthy et al., 2011). Hardware
accelerators are being developed for performing cryptographic functions including digital
signing, hashing, and authentication (Mathew et al., 2015). Keshavamurthy et al. (2011)
demonstrated a significant increase in performance in RSA-sign and verify operations
when using hardware acceleration such as the IBM Power7+ processor (Blaner et al.,
2013) or Intel’s Xeon v3 processors. Their results showed a 49.84% increase in speed of
performing DKIM operations by simply moving the cryptographic functions to a
hardware accelerator. As this study used RSA-sign and verify operations in a very
similar structure and programmatic environment, similar performance increases may also
be observed by using hardware accelerators.
DNS costs associated with retrieving the sender’s public key also contributed to a
major increase in performance overhead for both bandwidth consumption and
convergence times alike. Without restricting the fundamental ways DNS is implemented
in IPv6, future investigation should consider ways to reduced overhead. Callahan,
Allman, and Rabinovich (2013) specified that performance-driven tactics such as caching
or pre-fetching DNS queries as well as load balancing between DNS servers might
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minimize the perceived impact of performing lookups. In this model, similar tactics such
as DNS pre-fetching during idle time on the router may be able to shift some of the delay
to less crucial times in the BGP routing process. Pre-fetching and caching operations
impart overhead as well in terms of RAM and CPU utilization (Callahan et al., 2013), and
analysis would need to be done in order to determine if that strategy is worth the cost.
Additionally, software optimizations may be introduced into the OpenBGPD
routing system as well as the proposed attestation model. While the researcher intended
to implement the model minding the limiting behaviors of the code changes, there may
still be opportunities for further optimization. Programmers should analyze new
algorithms or models after they are implemented (Malik, 2014). Asymptotic notation or
Big-O notation could be used to describe the operation of OpenBGPD and the attestation
model. Once the algorithms are analyzed to determine their limiting behaviors can be
augmented to reduce overall runtime with more efficient algorithms.
Furthermore, parallel processing of the attestation model and the OpenBGPD
route decision engine may improve overall performance. Both the attestation model and
the route decision engine filter and disseminate routes in a linear fashion. Retrieving the
sender’s key and validating the message signature could be done alongside of the
standard route evaluation in a parallel implementation. This likely would not reduce
CPU and RAM utilization as the attestation methods still have a cost, but the results may
be improved from an overall convergence timing aspect. Certain barriers do exist in
parallel programming that make some instantiations perform worse than their nonparallel
counterparts perform. On small distributions of a problem set synchronization of code
between processes may cost more than the time saved through the parallel operations
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(Bauer, 2014). Again, further research should be done on using parallel programming in
routing environments as certain barriers
Summary
Problems identified by this research study resolved that BGP is susceptible to
harmful attacks such as sub-prefix hijacking, and proposed solutions carried a high cost
without recognizing potential impacts in an IPv6 environment. This study evaluated the
degree of impact using IPv6 extension headers would have on an environment when used
to perform BGP route attestation. Together, these principles were combined to create a
research question and hypothesis that directed the research in establishing an outcome.
The research showed that IPv6 extension headers are capable of carrying
cryptographic route attestation information. Statistically significant figures showed that
the model did impart overhead on a router running BGP in the following areas: CPU
performance, RAM utilization, bandwidth consumption, and route convergence times.
Extension headers reduced the performance overhead by the use of efficient header
processing and minimizing extra packets needing to be sent to perform attestation. While
the study was performed on the open source pfSense platform and OpenBGPD, they were
assumed to be in correct operation by the protocol specification. Overall, the model
shows an opportunity to expand upon the research performed in this study on other
factors that may lessen the observed performance impacts while still providing route
attestation.
This study adds to the overall body of knowledge pertaining to public routing
protocol security in the IPv6 space. In addition, the research performed in the study show
the applicability of leveraging IPv6 enhancements over IPv4 in an effort to improve
security. These enhancements also encourage the community to be mindful of the need
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to migrate to IPv6 and to consider the security implementations of doing so. Lastly, the
study supplies new literature and perspective to BGP security solutions and prospective
pathways to better secure the public Internet routing infrastructure.
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APPENDIX A: OPENBGPD ROUTER CONFIGURATIONS
This appendix contains the OpenBGPD device configuration files (bgpd.conf) that
were used on each of the participating routers in the study.
Router 1 (AS100)
AS 1000
fib-update yes
holdtime 90
router-id 192.168.1.1
log updates
network 2001:12:12:12::/64
neighbor 2001:12:12:12::2 {
descr "ASN2000"
announce all
remote-as 2000
local-address 2001:12:12:12::1
}
deny from any
deny to any
allow from 2001:12:12:12::2
allow to 2001:12:12:12::2
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Router 2 (AS2000)
AS 2000
fib-update yes
holdtime 90
router-id 192.168.1.1
log updates
network 2001:23:23:23::/64
network 2001:12:12:12::/64
network 2001:20:20:20::/64
neighbor 2001:23:23:23::2 {
descr "ASN3000"
announce all
remote-as 3000
local-address 2001:23:23:23::1
}
neighbor 2001:12:12:12::1 {
descr "ASN1000"
announce all
remote-as 1000
local-address 2001:12:12:12::2
}
deny from any
deny to any
allow from 2001:23:23:23::2
allow to 2001:23:23:23::2
allow from 2001:12:12:12::1
allow to 2001:12:12:12::1
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Router 3 (AS3000)
AS 3000
fib-update yes
holdtime 90
router-id 192.168.1.1
log updates
network 2001:23:23:23::/64
network 2001:30:30::/48
neighbor 2001:23:23:23::1 {
descr "ASN2000"
announce all
remote-as 2000
local-address 2001:23:23:23::2
}
deny from any
deny to any
allow from 2001:23:23:23::1
allow to 2001:23:23:23::1
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APPENDIX B: DNS ZONE CONFIGURATIONS
The following is an excerpt from the DNS server configuration showing a TXT
record that contains a public key. The public key obtained through a DNS record query
by routers performing route attestation on a received update. The TXT record was 216
bytes in size.
;
;
;

Zone records

*
TXT
(
"MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQCttCmLEmA3hH/wsk/u29
xPpRj+LlNFsEwg2P1IvNtVDcQaOhlPlqmUzXrztawANPXHlMjIR+Uzzsbzh
49Y4GZWw3dUMvE0KD76jz4RXQmtbh+nMNKKC3vDoDfFI6gT5trHZdWqLW0q
Lg8zaZKsjZqO8FBp6Sb8iI9QqryptKdVXwIDAQAB" )
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APPENDIX C: SUMMARIZED VMSTAT OUTPUT
For the charts below, each row with a trial number represents the average
gathered over 1,001 updates. Rows with the All heading are representations of the three
trials combined, being 3,003 updates.
Table C1
Summarized vmstat output collected from router receiving BGP updates with no route
attestation model in place.
Trial

RAM Consumed (KB)

Avg. RAM/Update (KB)

Process Time %

1

1,224

1.22

0.655104063

2

1,308

1.31

0.478691774

3

1,000

1.00

0.504468719

All

3,532

1.18

0.546115702

Table C2
Summarized vmstat output collected from router receiving BGP updates with route
attestation model in place.
Trial

RAM Consumed (KB)

Avg. RAM/Update (KB) Process Time %

1

26,340

26.31

3.529236868

2

26,340

26.31

3.958415842

3

24,036

24.01

5.005842259

All

76,716

25.55

4.169402495
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APPENDIX D: AVERAGE ROUTE UPDATE PROCESSING TIMES
Trial
1
2
3
All

Unsigned Update Average
Time (s)
0.000244
0.000193
0.000195
0.000211

Signed Update Average
Time (s)
0.019270
0.018162
0.019295
0.018330
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APPENDIX E: UNMODIFIED BGP UPDATE PACKET
IPv6, Src: 2001:12:12:12::1, Dst: 2001:12:12:12::2
Version: 6
Traffic class: 0x00 (DSCP: CS0, ECN: Not-ECT)
Flowlabel: 0x0009783c
Payload length: 101
Next header: TCP (6)
Hop limit: 1
Source: 2001:12:12:12::1
Destination: 2001:12:12:12::2
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 24213 (24213), Dst
Port: 179 (179), Seq: 1, Ack: 1, Len: 69
Border Gateway Protocol - UPDATE Message
Marker: ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
Length: 69
Type: UPDATE Message (2)
Withdrawn Routes Length: 0
Total Path Attribute Length: 46
Path attributes
Path Attribute - ORIGIN: IGP
Flags: 0x40
Type Code: ORIGIN (1)
Length: 1
Origin: IGP (0)
Path Attribute - AS_PATH: 1000
Flags: 0x40
Type Code: AS_PATH (2)
Length: 6
AS Path segment: 1000
Path Attribute - MP_REACH_NLRI
Flags: 0x80
Type Code: MP_REACH_NLRI (14)
Length: 30
Address family identifier (AFI): IPv6 (2)
SAFI: Unicast (1)
Next hop network address (16 bytes)
Number of Subnetwork points of attachment: 0
NLRI (9 bytes)
2001:30:30:fc17::/64
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APPENDIX F: MODIFIED BGP UPDATE PACKET
IPv6, Src: 2001:12:12:12::1, Dst: 2001:12:12:12::2
Version: 6
Traffic class: 0x00 (DSCP: CS0, ECN: Not-ECT)
Flowlabel: 0x0000007b
Payload length: 241
Next header: Authentication Header (51)
Hop limit: 10
Source: 2001:12:12:12::1
Destination: 2001:12:12:12::2
Authentication Header
Next header: TCP (0x06)
Length: 0x8c
AH SPI: 0x00000001
AH Sequence: 1
AH ICV:67c68635991af7400c2f8bf1280dbc12962ffc20b...
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 24213 (24213), Dst
Port: 179 (179), Seq: 1, Ack: 1, Len: 69
Border Gateway Protocol - UPDATE Message
Marker: ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
Length: 69
Type: UPDATE Message (2)
Withdrawn Routes Length: 0
Total Path Attribute Length: 46
Path attributes
Path Attribute - ORIGIN: IGP
Flags: 0x40
Type Code: ORIGIN (1)
Length: 1
Origin: IGP (0)
Path Attribute - AS_PATH: 1000
Flags: 0x40
Type Code: AS_PATH (2)
Length: 6
AS Path segment: 1000
Path Attribute - MP_REACH_NLRI
Flags: 0x80
Type Code: MP_REACH_NLRI (14)
Length: 30
Address family identifier (AFI): IPv6 (2)
SAFI: Unicast (1)
Next hop network address (16 bytes)
Number of Subnetwork points of attachment: 0
NLRI information (9 bytes)
2001:30:30:fc17::/64
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APPENDIX G: REPRESENTATION OF DNS QUERY AND RESPONSE
DNS Query:
Source: 2001:20:20:20::1
Destination: 2001:20:20:20::2
Protocol: DNS
Length: 154
Standard query 0xf271 TXT
7.1.c.f.0.3.0.0.0.3.0.0.1.0.0.2
Queries:
Name: 7.1.c.f.0.3.0.0.0.3.0.0.1.0.0.2: type TXT, class IN
DNS Response:
Source: 2001:20:20:20::2
Destination: 2001:20:20:20::1
Protocol: DNS
Length: 383
Standard query response 0xf271 TXT
7.1.c.f.0.3.0.0.0.3.0.0.1.0.0.2 TXT OPT
Queries:
Name: 7.1.c.f.0.3.0.0.0.3.0.0.1.0.0.2: type TXT, class IN
Answers
TXT:MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQCttCmLEmA3hH
/wsk/u29xPpRj+LlNFsEwg2P1IvNtVDcQaOhlPlqmUzXrztawANPXH
lMjIR+Uzzsbzh49Y4GZWw3dUMvE0KD76jz4RXQmtbh+nMNKKC3vDoD
fFI6gT5trHZdWqLW0qLg8zaZKsjZqO8FBp6Sb8iI9QqryptKdVXwID
AQAB
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APPENDIX H: PROGRAMATIC PATCHES APPLIED TO OPENBGPD
The accompanying online archive shows the programmatic changes applied to the
OpenBGPD source code to gather timing statistics as well as the implementation of the
attestation model. These programmatic changes are displayed in the format of a diffpatch, which examines the differences between the original OpenBGPD source code as
compared to the changes necessary for compilation on pfSense and those required for this
study. Patches on the online archive are used to modify the bgpd process, the parent
process of OpenBGPD.
Files and Directories:
•

signed_bgpd/pfsense_patches

•

timed_bgpd/pfsense_patches

Location of online repository:
https://github.com/DSUmjham/Dissertation
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APPENDIX I: DNS ROUND TRIP TRANSACTION TIMES
Trial
1
2
3
All

DNS Query Round Trip Time Avg. (s)
0.000693
0.000568
0.000806
0.000689

